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ABSTRACT 
 
My dissertation examines the effect of several changes occurring in the retail environment. In the 
first essay, I study competition among retail formats. I examine the phenomenon retailers call 
channel blurring: consumers moving their purchases from channels traditionally associated with 
that category to alternative channels. At one time, different retail formats served different 
purposes, but they are slowly becoming indistinguishable. For example, mass merchandisers are 
now carrying sizeable assortments of groceries and pharmaceuticals, while drug chains such are 
stocking their shelves with toys and household items. I examine how consumers are responding 
to these changes. My results show that consumers view retail formats as substitutable, that 
households who are more brand loyal are also more retail format loyal, and that households who 
purchase private labels are also format loyal. 
In the second essay, I examine retail chain choice behavior at the basket level. I develop a 
model of retail chain choice behavior to understand what factors underlie this decision. The 
results show that the retailers’ food price image has a bigger impact than non-food price image, 
and that different retailers have customers who use assortment differently. Implications of this 
are discussed with respect to marketing mix decisions. 
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In the third essay, I examine retail competition from a legal perspective by performing an 
empirical analysis of the case history of the Robinson-Patman Act. While the stated goal of the 
Act is to prevent price discrimination and level the playing field for small buyers, in reality the 
marketplace may not be not aligned with this goal. Anecdotal evidence suggests that Wal-Mart 
and others obtain better prices for the same goods when compared with small competitors. I find 
evidence that the Brooke Group Supreme Court ruling significantly decreased the probability of 
a plaintiff winning a Robinson-Patman case. The finding is particularly evident in primary-line 
cases and cases where the issue of competitive harm is addressed. Additionally, I find the 
importance of plaintiff resources changes after the Brooke Group ruling such that small plaintiffs 
are significantly more successful than large plaintiffs before Brooke Group but are significantly 
less successful after the ruling.  
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1.0 DISSERTATION INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the past several decades, the retail environment has undergone great change. We have 
witnessed the proliferation of the big-box retailer including the growth of Wal-Mart, club stores 
like Costco, and category killers like Best Buy and Lowes. These changes have resulted in a 
plethora of choices for the average consumer and in this dissertation I attempt to address issues 
associated with the changing retail environment. 
These changes in the retail environment are well documented in the business and popular 
press but it is unclear how consumers are responding to these shifts in the competitive 
environment at an individual level. Consumers may respond in divergent ways as retailers add 
outlets and assortment options. One strategy that consumers may use is one-stop shopping in 
which they make the largest proportion of their purchases at larger outlets carrying a wider 
selection of goods. Consumers adopting such a strategy typically value the convenience offered 
by these large stores and forego the benefits of shopping multiple outlets. These benefits may 
include better prices due to greater exposure to promotions, or wider assortment options for 
individual categories because no one store can carry every item in a category.  
The fact that these potential benefits exist implies an alternative strategy in which 
consumers shop multiple outlets for a given category of goods to minimize their overall cost of 
merchandise (e.g., Fox and Hoch 2005; Gauri, Sudhir, and Talukdar 2007). This “cherry-
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picking” behavior is undesirable for retailers because one impetus for offering promotions is to 
drive store traffic in the hope of obtaining a larger share of consumers’ requirements (Kumar and 
Leone 1988). Thus, if consumers are simply perusing outlets to purchase items that are on 
promotion, a retailer strategy of adding new categories as loss leaders may not be effective.  
The changing retail environment also leads me to question the impact of these changes on 
the legal environment.  While most marketing practitioners and academics are aware of the 
Robinson-Patman Act, little work in marketing has been done. Stevens (1937), in an early 
Journal of Marketing article, offers support for the Robinson-Patman Act and argues that 
obtaining lower input prices by negotiating with suppliers is unfair competition and that 
competitive advantage should be gained through production efficiency, not size. Tarpey (1972) 
examines several FTC cases to assess the legal liability of buyers who bargain for preferential 
prices under the Act. Marks and Inlow (1988) study U.S. District Court actions under Robinson-
Patman from 1961 to 1986 to discern patterns in the practice of price discrimination with a focus 
on the impact of the Act on small business. Spriggs and Nevin (1994) analyze functional 
discounts and suggest that authorities should be conscious of their pro-competitive effects. This 
dissertation, in contrast to much previous work, does not attempt to discuss the merits of the Act 
or anti-trust laws in general. Rather, I take the law as a given reality and quantify how the 
interpretation of the law has changed after the landmark Brooke Group ruling.  
 
1.1 SYNOPSIS OF ESSAY 1 
 
In my first essay, I study retail competition at the highest level—competition among retail 
formats. I examine the phenomenon retailers call channel blurring: consumers moving their 
3 
 
purchases of a product category from channels traditionally associated with that category (e.g., 
grocery) to alternative channels (e.g., mass, club, extreme value/dollar). At one time, different 
retail formats such as grocery, drug, and mass merchandiser served different purposes, but they 
are slowly becoming indistinguishable. For example, large mass merchandisers such as Wal-
Mart are now carrying sizeable assortments of grocery, pharmaceutical, and electronic products, 
while large drug chains such as Eckerd and CVS are stocking their shelves with toys and 
household items. I seek to understand how consumers are responding to these changes.  
Existing work in marketing has focused mostly on competition between stores of the 
same format, typically grocery stores (e.g., Bell and Lattin 1998; Lal and Rao 1997). Some 
marketing scholars have argued that studying only grocery stores gives an incomplete picture of 
retail competition. Academics have studied how categories are associated with certain retail 
formats (Inman, Shankar and Ferraro 2004), how competitive entry affects grocery stores (Singh, 
Karsten and Blattberg 2006), and how aggregate household spending varies across retail formats 
(Fox, Montgomery and Lodish 2004). I extend this nascent area of literature by studying the 
intertemporal and household level factors that affect consumers’ retail format choice decision, as 
well as study the correlates of multi-format shopping. 
In the essay, I address the following two primary research questions related to retail 
format shopping (1) Given the growth in alternative retail formats, how are consumers splitting 
their purchases across retail formats (cross-format shopping)? (2)Are covariates such as 
shopping behaviors, demographic factors, and category-level factors associated with consumer 
cross-format shopping? If so, how? 
To this end, I model the consumer retail format choice decision using a multinomial logit 
choice model and estimate it within a hierarchical Bayesian framework. The estimated model 
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uses a very flexible mixture of normals heterogeneity distribution. The choice model is followed 
up by a second analysis where I examine factors that are associated with the degree of channel 
blurring for a household.  
My results show that consumers view retail formats as substitutable, that households who 
are more brand loyal are also more retail format loyal, and that households who purchase private 
labels are also format loyal. 
 
1.2 SYNOPSIS OF ESSAY 2 
 
In my second essay, I look deeper into the changing retail environment and examine household 
choice behavior at the basket level. I examine how households obtain their entire breadth of 
needs and the nature of competition among competing retailers. 
I develop a multivariate probit model of household retail chain choice behavior to study 
the factors that underlie the chain choice decision.  The factors that I examine include price 
image, assortment, household requirements, distance and state dependence. In estimating the 
model, I hope to understand how these factors affect the chain choice decision as well as 
quantify the effect of these factors. 
Additionally, I seek to understand what factors are important in the household chain 
choice decision and if households use different retail chains in a complementary or competing 
fashion. I estimate the proposed model on a unique set of panel data from Nielsen. These data 
enable one of the most complete pictures of the retail environment in the marketing literature to 
date. I do this by utilizing three databases of information including: the complete purchase record 
for a given household in all retail outlets for three years, a demographic file for every household, 
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and a file with store characteristics  and location of each retail outlet. I seek to answer the 
following research questions: (1) What factors are important in the retail chain choice decision? 
(2) Is the relationship among retailers complementary, substitutable or independent? 
The results of the essay reveal several interesting insights. First, I find that the retailers’ 
food price image has a bigger impact than its non-food price image on the store choice decision. 
This suggests that promotion policies should focus on these categories as they have a bigger 
impact on driving store traffic. Additionally, I find that different retailers have customers who 
use assortment differently. For example, the mass merchandiser that I analyze has customers 
who utilize greater assortment breadth but less assortment depth but the drug store’s customers 
use greater depth and less breadth. Implications of this are discussed with respect to assortment 
expansion and deletion. 
 
1.3  SYNOPSIS OF ESSAY 3 
 
In the third essay, I examine retail competition from a legal perspective by performing an 
empirical analysis of the case history of the Robinson-Patman Act. While the stated goal of the 
Robinson-Patman Act is to prevent price discrimination and level the playing field for small 
buyers, in reality the marketplace may not be aligned with this goal. Much anecdotal evidence 
suggests that Wal-Mart and other big-box retailers can and do obtain better prices for the same 
goods when compared with small, localized competitors.  
It is within the context of this environment that I examine the Robinson-Patman Act to 
quantify how the changes in the legal interpretation of the Act affect the outcome of cases in 
federal court. While other scholars have examined the effect of the Brooke Group ruling from a 
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legal perspective (e.g. Baker 1994; Denger and Herfort 1994), to my knowledge, this is the first 
attempt to empirically examine the effect of the ruling. I do this from a business prospective to 
quantify the actual risk faced by businesses with the goal of explaining how the Brooke Group 
ruling affects case outcomes. 
 
To this end, I collect data on the outcome of Robinson-Patman Act cases in the federal 
court system for 25 years, from 1982 to 2006. I use this data to estimate a model where I 
empirically examine whether the likelihood of success for plaintiffs has decreased following the 
Brooke Group ruling.  I account for other factors that may explain the relative success of 
plaintiffs by including characteristics of plaintiffs and defendants as well as characteristics from 
the case.  Additionally, I include a structural break in the model’s parameters following the 
Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson (1993) Supreme Court ruling which allows us to study 
how the effect of case characteristics changes in the aftermath of this ruling.  
From this analysis, I find evidence that the Brooke Group ruling significantly decreased 
the probability of a plaintiff winning a Robinson-Patman case. The decrease in probability is 
particularly evident in primary-line cases and cases where the defense raised the issue of 
competitive harm. Additionally, I find the importance of plaintiff resources changes after the 
Brooke Group ruling. While small plaintiffs are significantly more successful than large 
plaintiffs before Brooke Group, this result reverses afterward and large plaintiffs now do better 
than their small counterparts.  
Together these three essays attempt to shed light on issues in retail competition. The 
results from these three essays will have important implications for consumers, marketers, and 
academics. The next three chapters present the essays of this dissertation. Essay 1 is entitled, 
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“Channel Blurring: A Study of Cross-Retail Format Shopping among U.S. Households.” Essay 2 
is entitled, “The Role of Price Image and Assortment in Determining Retail Chain Choice.” 
Essay 3 is entitled, “Is the Robinson-Patman Act Dead?” These essays are followed by a 
discussion of the overall contribution of the dissertation, the implications for academics and 
marketing practitioners, and a discussion of future research opportunities. 
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2.0 ESSAY 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Channel Blurring: A Study of Cross-Retail Format Shopping among U.S. 
Households 
 
 
 
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
As of January 31, 2008, Wal-Mart, a mass merchandise chain, operates over 2400 supercenters 
in the United States and has achieved a sizeable position in the U.S. grocery market with over 
$130 billion in grocery revenue for 2007 (Progressive Grocer, May 2008). While this expansion 
of a mass merchandise chain into the grocery channel or retail format has been impressive, the 
proliferation of the extreme value or “dollar store” format may be just as notable. According to 
Nielsen, the top five chains in the dollar store format added over 5,000 distribution points in the 
first five years of this decade1
                                                 
1 TD Link store count data 
. One way in which traditional retailers— grocery stores, drug 
stores, and mass merchandisers other than Wal-Mart—are responding to these changes is to 
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expand their assortment by increasing variety in areas where they have not traditionally been a 
competitor, including general merchandise for traditional retailers and groceries for mass 
merchandisers. Thus, looking at the retail market at an aggregate level, it appears that the 
traditional roles of the retail channels are blurring and it is becoming harder to distinguish among 
retail formats on the basis of assortment.  
Existing work in marketing has focused mostly on competition between stores of the 
same format, typically grocery stores (e.g., Bell and Lattin 1998; Lal and Rao 1997). Some 
marketing scholars have argued that studying only grocery stores gives an incomplete picture of 
retail competition. Academics have studied how categories are associated with certain retail 
formats (Inman, Shankar and Ferraro 2004), how competitive entry affects grocery stores (Singh, 
Karsten and Blattberg 2006), and how aggregate household spending varies across retail formats 
(Fox, Montgomery and Lodish 2004). I extend this nascent area of literature by studying the 
intertemporal and household level factors that affect consumers’ retail format choice decision, as 
well as study the correlates of multi-format shopping 
While changes in the retail environment are well documented in the business and popular 
press, it is unclear how consumers are responding to these shifts in the competitive environment 
at an individual level. Consumers may respond in divergent ways as retailers add outlets and 
assortment options. One strategy that consumers may use is one-stop shopping where they make 
the largest proportion of their purchases at larger outlets carrying a wider selection of goods. 
Consumers adopting such a strategy typically value the convenience offered by these large stores 
and forego the benefits of shopping multiple outlets. These forgone benefits include better prices 
for some items due to greater exposure to promotions, or deeper assortment options for 
individual categories because no one store can carry every item in a category. The fact that these 
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potential benefits exist implies an alternative strategy in which consumers shop multiple outlets 
for a given category of goods to minimize their overall cost of merchandise (e.g., Fox and Hoch 
2005; Gauri, Sudhir, and Talukdar 2007). This “cherry-picking” behavior is undesirable for 
retailers because one impetus for offering promotions is to drive store traffic in the hope of 
obtaining a larger share of consumers’ requirements (Kumar and Leone 1988). Thus, if 
consumers are simply perusing outlets to purchase items that are on promotion, a retailer strategy 
of adding new categories to generate store traffic may not be effective.  
An examination of cross-channel or cross-retail format shopping has important 
implications for both managers and public policy makers. From a managerial standpoint, a better 
understanding of consumer shopping strategies will enable managers to formulate a better 
marketing strategy. For instance, if most consumers are simply shopping multiple outlets to 
minimize their total cost for a given category, it may not make sense to expand assortment to 
include low margin, traffic-inducing products. However, if the majority of consumers are one-
stop shoppers and buy where their overall needs can be best met, expanding assortment may be 
an effective strategy. I seek to shed some light on this important issue. 
From a consumer perspective, I seek to determine whether changes in the environment 
have led to a situation where lower income groups are not experiencing the same benefits of 
increased retail options as the rest of the population. This situation may arise because retailers 
often expand into areas where the economic environment is the best, giving higher income 
consumers more options. Moreover, low income consumers may not have the economic means 
to visit multiple outlets, potentially leading to higher average costs of goods for these consumers. 
However, the impact of this issue may be mitigated by the proliferation of dollar stores. This 
format may ease problems for lower income consumers, as these outlets offer a wide assortment 
11 
 
of categories at low prices, but do not require the level of business needed to support a large 
200,000 sq. ft. supercenter.  
In this essay, I address the following primary research questions related to retail format 
shopping: 
• Given the growth in alternative retail formats, how are consumers splitting their purchases 
across retail formats (cross-format shopping)? 
• Are covariates such as shopping traits, demographic factors, and category-level factors 
associated with consumer cross-format shopping? If so, how? 
To address these questions, I develop a model of the household retail format choice decision 
and estimate the model in a hierarchical Bayesian framework. This estimation procedure 
incorporates a very flexible heterogeneity distribution since I utilize a mixture of normals 
distribution which can approximate the shape of many distributions very well. This property of 
the model is important, as I expect divergent preferences for the competing retail formats among 
households in the dataset. I estimate the model using data from Nielsen’s Homescan consumer 
panel from two product categories, facial tissue and laundry detergent, during the period 2001-
2003. I introduce a cross-format shopping measure that I call the Channel Blurring Index, which 
describes the degree of multi-format shopping by a household, and explore the factors associated 
with this Index at a household level.   
This essay contributes to the marketing literature in three important ways. First, through 
the theoretical development, I identify and describe both demand and supply side forces 
associated with retailer format decisions and consumer choice of retail format. Second, I 
introduce a new metric to capture cross-channel shopping. Finally, the findings offer substantive 
insights into the factors associated with channel choice and cross-format shopping.  
12 
 
2.2 THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
2.2.1 
 
Because the topic of multi-format shopping is relatively nascent and unexplored, I examine the 
literature from the broader area of store choice. Researchers have looked at the characteristics of 
retail outlets, including convenience, selection, and store attributes, to assess how these factors 
affect store patronage. Arnold, Oum and Tigret (1983) examine a cross-section of different cities 
and find that store choice drivers are heterogeneous across cities.  Louviere and Gaeth (1987) 
study the effects of price, quality, selection, and convenience on store choice. Kumar and 
Karande (2000) segment retail outlets based upon the socioeconomic characteristics of the trade 
area and find that the effects of store environment vary across segments. 
Grocery Store Choice Literature 
Some research has examined store choice by comparing retail outlets with different price 
formats. Bell and Lattin (1998) use market basket data to show that large basket shoppers prefer 
everyday low pricing (EDLP) over Hi-Lo stores. Bell, Ho and Tang (1998) develop a theoretical 
model and test it on panel data to show that price format preference is driven by consumers’ 
efforts to minimize their total cost of shopping. Bolton and Shankar (2003) show that the EDLP 
vs. Hi-Lo dichotomy in price format is insufficient, and that it should be extended to more price 
formats that differ on four underlying dimensions: relative price, price variation, deal intensity 
and deal support. Lal and Rao (1997) use a theoretical model to show that EDLP and Hi-Lo 
stores should use different strategies to appeal to differing segments of consumers in both price 
and service. 
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Table 1 
Selected Studies Related to Channel Blurring 
Paper Data Model Main Results 
Arnold, Oum and 
Tigert (1983) 
Survey of 
households in 6 
cities Multinomial logit  
No seasonality of parameters. Different factors 
important in various cities.  
Bell and Lattin (1998) 
Scanner panel data, 
market basket 
Nested multinomial logit: 
brand choice, purchase 
incidence, and store choice. 
Large basket shoppers prefer EDLP over Hi-Lo 
stores. 
Bell, Ho, and Tang 
(1998) IRI shopping basket 
Theoretical model of total 
shopping costs. 
Large basket shoppers can bear higher fixed cost 
to obtain lower variable costs. 
Bhatnagar and 
Ratchford (2004) 
Survey, Self report 
data 
Analytical approach using 
microeconomics to generate 
hypotheses. Consumers minimize expected total costs. 
Bolton and Shankar 
(2003)  Nielsen and IRI Cluster analysis 
Retailers use five different pricing policies that 
differ on four underlying dimensions: relative 
price, price variation, deal intensity and deal 
support. 
Bucklin and Lattin 
(1992)  Nielsen Nested multinomial logit 
Promotion did not induce store switching in the 
laundry detergent category. 
Fox, Montgomery and 
Lodish (2004) IRI panel Multivariate Tobit 
Substitution within grocery stores stronger than 
across formats. 
Inman, Shankar and 
Ferraro (2004) Spectra 
Linear regression 
Correspondence analysis Categories are associated with specific channels 
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Table 1 Continued 
Paper Data Model Main Results 
Kumar and Karande 
(2000) 
A.C. Nielsen Market 
Metrics Linear regression 
Look at the effect of internal and external store 
characteristics on store performance. 
Kumar and Leone 
(1988) Store data Linear regression 
Some of the increases in sales during promotion 
to due store switching. 
Lal and Rao (1997) Survey Theoretical model 
EDLP and Hi-Lo stores should use different 
strategies to appeal to differing segments of 
consumers in both price and service. 
Louviere and Gaeth 
(1988) Survey/experiment Conjoint-like analysis 
Examine preference for selection, convenience, 
quality, and their interactions 
Messinger and 
Narasimhan (1997) 
Aggregate U.S. 
Supermarket Data Theoretical model 
Increases in per capita disposable income has 
lead to greater supermarket assortment, 
presumably because of a demand for time 
convenience 
Popkowski-Leszczyc 
and Timmermans 
(1997) Nielsen Binary Probit Conclude that switching is random. 
Singh, Karsten and 
Blattberg (2006) 
Frequent shopper database 
from a single grocery store 
Joint model of inter-
purchase time and basket 
size 
Incumbent supermarket lost 17% of their volume 
to a Wal-Mart Supercenter 
15 
 
 
 
 Store switching behavior has also been examined in the literature. Kumar and Leone (1988) 
examine retail price promotions and find that some of the sales increase during promotion is due to 
store switching. In contrast, Bucklin and Lattin (1992) find no store switching effect. Popkowski-
Leszcyc and Timmermans (1997) examine switching among competing grocery stores and find that 
households with two wage earners tend to be more loyal and make less shopping trips, while 
households with one wage earner tend to shop more. Messinger and Narasimhan (1997) show that 
increases in per capita disposable income has lead to greater supermarket assortment, presumably 
because of a demand for time convenience.  
 
2.2.2 Multiple Retail Format Research 
 
While much of the work in this area focuses on grocery stores, researchers have been studying issues 
that span multiple retail formats.  Bhatnager and Ratchford (2004) use a general model based on 
microeconomic theory to show the optimality of the different retail formats is dependent on 
membership fees, travel costs, consumption rates, perishability of products, inventory holding costs 
of consumers, and cost structures of retailers. Inman, Shankar, and Ferraro (2004) show that specific 
categories are associated with specific channels. Fox, Montgomery, and Lodish (2004) study 
shopping behavior across several formats, including grocery stores, mass merchandisers, and drug 
stores, and find that store substitution is stronger within the grocery format than across formats. 
Singh, Karsten and Blattberg (2006) examine the effect of the entry of a Wal-Mart Supercenter on an 
incumbent grocery store. They find that the incumbent store lost 17% of its sales volume to the new 
entrant. 
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Our work extends these literatures by exploiting the panel nature of our data to examine the 
intertemporal factors, as well as household level factors that drive the household retail format choice 
decision. In addition, we use the estimates from the retail format choice model as well as cross-
sectional variables to examine the correlates of multi-format shopping. In the following section, we 
provide a theoretical rationale as to why consumers may engage in multi-channel shopping. 
 
2.2.3 Drivers of Channel Blurring 
 
Demand-Side Drivers.  Evidence from consumer panel data suggests that consumers are shopping at 
more channels than ever before. While household penetration of the traditional channels including 
grocery (99%), mass merchandisers (89%) and drug stores (84%) remains high, penetration rates in 
alternative channels including dollar (68%) and club/warehouse (50%) are rising2
 However, not all consumers are likely to engage in this behavior. Households with two wage 
earners and little time for shopping may be making fewer shopping trips and may be more loyal to a 
given store. Popkowski-Leszcyc and Timmermans (1997) find evidence for this phenomenon in the 
. As households 
shop at more types of outlets, they will be exposed to more promotions and could switch channels 
from which they traditionally buy a given category (Kumar and Leone 1988). Moreover, research 
has shown that consumers record only about 40% of what they actually purchase on their shopping 
lists (Block and Morwitz 1999), which suggests that much of the decision-making process is done in 
the store and that in-store marketing may play an important role. These factors imply that some 
consumers are likely to engage in cherry-picking behavior (e.g., Fox and Hoch 2005; Gauri, Sudhir, 
and Talukdar 2007) and buy a given category when a deal is available at an outlet where they are 
shopping.  
                                                 
2 Estimated from the Neilsen Homescan panel 2001-2003. 
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context of grocery stores. Additionally, households may simply shop at the same format every time 
out of habit. 
 Supply-Side Drivers.  Retailers and manufacturers may also be contributing to channel 
blurring. Retailers who are successful in one format are transferring their competencies into other 
formats. The transition of Wal-Mart from their traditional stores with mostly general merchandise 
and limited food items into Supercenters with full-fledged grocery departments is the most notable 
example. Kroger is developing its supercenter concept, known as Kroger Marketplace in some 
markets, which combines their traditional grocery assortment with a larger nonfood department and 
pharmacy in markets throughout the United States (Drug Store News, November 22, 2004). Drug 
stores such as Walgreens, which opened 476 stores in 2006, many with expanded assortments, are 
adding to the trend as well.3 Much of this activity could simply be a response to competitive 
pressure. 
 One factor that contributes to the ability of retailers to increase the breadth of their 
assortment is the trend toward stores with larger footprints. The U.S. Economic Census shows an 
environment where the average size of a retail outlet is growing. The average size of a retail grocery 
facility was nearly 15,700 ft2 in 2002 as compared to just above 8500 ft2 ten years prior in 1992. 
Furthermore, the number of warehouse club stores and supercenters, at an average floor space of 
140,000 ft2
 Product manufacturers have a strong incentive to respond to these changes by seeking 
distribution in these new outlets. By gaining additional distribution, manufacturers can reduce their 
dependency on individual retailers. This is an important issue, as research has shown that the balance 
, nearly doubled from 1997 to 2002. This trend toward increased size opens up shelf 
space opportunities for manufacturers to get their products distributed through additional outlets. 
                                                 
3 2006 Walgreen’s Annual Report. 
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of power in channel relationships may be shifting toward retailers (e.g., Geylani, Dukes, and 
Srinivasan 2007). Anecdotal evidence supports this as well and the growth in power of Wal-Mart is 
well documented in the business press. Furthermore, manufacturers seek additional distribution 
opportunities in order to better compete with other manufacturers. If consumers shift their buying 
habits, such that they buy a given product category in a new retail format, and a manufacturer does 
not have distribution in this format, market share will be lost. 
 
2.2.4 Channel Blurring Index 
 
To capture the level of channel blurring for a household, I define a summary measure of cross-
channel shopping that I call the Channel Blurring Index (CBI). The CBI is conceptually similar to 
Herfindahl Index, but differs in two important ways. First, I take the complement of the sum of 
squares of purchases so that greater dispersion of channel shopping has a higher Channel Blurring 
Index. Second, I normalize the index so that it ranges from zero to one. The following is the equation 
for CBI: 
 
(1) 
Where n is the number of channel options in the market4 and SOVi
 In the analysis, I view CBI from two levels: aggregate and individual. This is an important 
distinction as the two levels of analysis may show different trends. For example, at an aggregate or 
 is the quantity weighted share of 
volume of category i in the market. The index equals zero when complete channel loyalty exists and 
one when the volume of purchases are split equally among all channels.  
                                                 
4 Clearly, this measure is undefined when there is only one channel option in the market. However, the purpose of the measure is to be 
used in markets where multiple channel options exist. 
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market level, channels may be blurring due to the fact that additional channel options are available, 
or existing channels now carry a wider assortment of goods. However, at an individual level, 
individuals may respond to changes in aggregate assortment in one of two ways. First, consumers 
could use multiple retail formats to engage in cherry-picking behavior and buy their category 
requirements when they observe price promotions in a given retail outlet. Second, consumers could 
consolidate their purchases into one format by taking advantage of the breadth of assortment that 
many stores now offer. In the remaining sections of this essay, I perform empirical analyses to 
examine these issues and try to provide insight into the research questions I posed at the beginning 
of the essay.  
 
2.3 DATA 
 
To carry out this study, I utilize data from the Nielsen Homescan panel of consumers. This dataset 
tracks the purchases from over 125,000 U.S. households across all retail outlets. Thus, it is uniquely 
suited to study consumer choice behavior across retail outlets including those corporations who do 
not share their scanner data with marketing research services such as Nielsen. While I have data for 
all U.S. markets, I utilize data from only the St. Louis market to better define the competitive set for 
a given household. That is, the distribution intensity for a given chain varies greatly across markets 
and by using only one market, I eliminate these differences. The data cover the period from 2001 to 
2003 and involve two product categories, facial tissue and laundry detergent. 
 In the empirical analyses, I analyze data at the category level rather than at the shopping 
basket level. Analyzing data at the category level provides for a conservative test of whether 
consumers are engaging in cross-format shopping. That is, it would not be surprising to find that 
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consumers utilize multiple retail formats for their breadth of needs as different formats specialize in 
different categories and consumers likely need multiple types of retailers to satisfy their needs. 
However, looking at basket level data may be a fruitful avenue of research and I analyze retail chain 
choice at the basket level in the second essay of this dissertation. 
 
2.3.1 Demographic Variables 
 
The Nielsen Homescan database tracks certain demographic variables along with the purchase 
history of consumers. I use this database in the empirical analyses because one of the objectives is to 
examine if demographics are associated with retail format preferences. Because retailers of different 
formats carry different assortments of brand, size and quality, they will likely attract different 
households. The demographic variables in the database include shopper gender, household income, 
household size and work status. I expect that these variables will be able to capture variance in 
preferences due to household requirements as well as time availability to shop at formats that are less 
convenient, but offering better prices.  
 
2.3.2 Shopping Behaviors 
 
Consumer shopping behaviors such as category volume purchased, brand type, time elapsed since 
last purchase, and average price paid are also likely to impact consumer’s choice of channel or retail 
format (Kushwaha and Shankar 2007). Quantity of purchase or usage rate is one such shopping trait 
that can be measured by the total category volume purchased by the household.  Households with 
larger category volume may purchase more from multiple retail formats to fulfill their category 
needs. There is considerable variation across formats with regard to the product sizes they stock. For 
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example, most club stores do not carry a single box of facial tissue, but are likely to carry multiple 
boxes in a single pack. Thus, shoppers who have the need for large quantities as well as the desire 
and ability to store inventory will likely buy from this format. Given that different retailers stock 
units of different sizes, quantity is an endogenous variable. Thus, I use a lagged quantity variable as 
an instrument for quantity in the model. 
 The type of brand and consumer retail format choice also have a similar relationship. Not all 
retailers stock the same set of brands, so brand preferences will have some bearing on the format 
decision. To parsimoniously capture the effect of the type of brand on retail format choice, I treat 
type of brand as a dichotomous variable--retailer or manufacturer brand. I use the lag of this variable 
as an instrument to account for endogeneity (e.g., Villas-Boas and Winer 1999).  
  I also expect the length of time elapsed since the last purchase of the category to affect the 
retail format choice decision. As the time since the last category purchase becomes larger, it 
becomes increasingly likely that a household’s inventory is depleted. In such a situation, consumers 
may be willing to purchase goods from retail formats that are different than their typical sources for 
that category. Accordingly, preference for a particular retail format should decrease as time since last 
purchase increases.  
 Average price paid will also be an important variable in the channel format choice. However, 
the effect of price at this level is somewhat complicated. Consumers likely have imperfect 
information about prices at each retailer and often must visit the store to obtain the actual pricing 
information. If the household inventory is depleted and if the category is needed, the consumer must 
either decide to purchase the category at a high price or make another shopping trip to another 
retailer to obtain a better price. In another scenario, consumers may be at a retail format where they 
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do not typically purchase the focal category, but if they observe a price promotion, they may 
purchase the item in that format even though they are not in immediate need of the category. 
 Although I have information on price paid for a particular transaction in the database, I do 
not have data on prices of competing brands for that purchase occasion. Thus, I use a proxy for price 
paid by creating a trip weighted mean price for each week in the database.  
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Aggregate CBI: 2001 = 0.776 2002 = 0.8170 2003 = 0.832
Figure 1A
Share of Volume by Channel: Facial Tissue
Figure 1B
Share of Volume by Channel: Laundry Detergent
Aggregate CBI: 2001 = 0.778 2002 = 0.796 2003 = 0.823
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2.3.3 Descriptive Analysis 
 
Tables 2A and 2B contain descriptive statistics for five retail formats, grocery, drug, dollar or 
extreme value, mass merchandise including supercenter, and wholesale club. These tables show 
considerable variance in characteristics across channels. Our data shows that the dollar and club 
formats offer the lowest prices for the categories studied. Interestingly, the club channel attracts 
shoppers with the highest income level and the dollar channel attracts those with the lowest income, 
suggesting that preference for a low price spans all income levels.  Club stores also attract the largest 
households and have the largest quantity purchased per trip. This finding could be related to the fact 
that the assortment in club stores mainly comprises large quantity SKU’s.  
 A descriptive analysis can show also show the trends in channel utilization by consumers 
over the three year period of our data (see Figures 1A & 1B). The facial tissue category is purchased 
heavily through the grocery (39%) and mass merchandising channels (45%). However, the dominant 
position of these two channels is in jeopardy as the combined share of volume for grocery and mass 
merchandise fell from 85% in 2001 to 81% in 2003. This fact is also supported by our channel 
blurring measure, which increases from 0.778 to 0.823 during the same period. Much of the gains in 
share went to the dollar and club channels, as the dollar channel grew from 1% in 2001 to 2% in 
2003 and the club channel grew from 8% in 2001to 11% in 2003. The liquid detergent data show 
very similar trends where the grocery and mass merchandise channels are losing volume share to 
dollar and club stores (86% combined share in 2001 vs. 79% combined share in 2003). Thus, at an 
aggregate level, it appears that consumers are utilizing alternative channels at a higher rate. But what 
does this imply for individual behavior? 
25 
 
 
 
 
Table 2A 
Trip-Weighted Descriptive Statistics for Facial Tissue 
Channel 
Annual 
Household 
Income 
% Two-Wage 
Households 
% Retired or 
Non-working 
households 
Household 
Size 
% Trips 
by 
Males 
Mean Price 
per Tissue 
% 
Private 
Label 
Mean 
Quantity/Trip 
(# Tissues) 
Grocery $47,150 25.5% 37.3% 2.30 20.1% $0.0105  19.4%           244   
Mass $53,471 34.1% 25.8% 2.49 15.9% $0.0102  10.3%           323   
Drug $49,639 20.8% 42.1% 2.12 17.3% $0.0109  16.3%           297   
Dollar $34,346 21.6% 35.9% 2.23 19.7% $0.0079  4.6%           254   
Club $69,329 48.4% 29.0% 2.70 34.7% $0.0084  1.6%        1,201    
          
 
 
 
Table 2B 
Trip-Weighted Descriptive Statistics for Laundry Detergent 
Channel 
Annual 
Household 
Income 
% Two-Wage 
Households 
% Retired or 
Non-working 
households 
Household 
Size 
% Trips 
by 
Males 
Mean Price 
per Ounce 
% 
Private 
Label 
Mean 
Quantity/Trip 
(# Ounces) 
Grocery $50,308 31.8% 36.7% 2.47 19.4% $0.0510  8.3%           117   
Mass $53,968 41.8% 21.6% 2.73 13.9% $0.0489  2.2%           129   
Drug $51,110 27.7% 39.1% 2.36 15.3% $0.0481  1.6%           123   
Dollar $41,017 32.1% 19.2% 2.22 7.3% $0.0465  0.1%           100   
Club $69,697 50.9% 16.0% 2.81 36.3% $0.0485  2.5%           300    
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 At the household level, I also find support for the idea that consumers are utilizing multiple 
channels for their purchases(see Figures 2A & 2B). An examination of the facial tissue category 
shows that only 12% of households are loyal to one channel over the three years of data that I 
examine. Moreover, most consumers split their purchases considerably across channels, as 59% of 
households have Channel Blurring Indexes of 0.4 or greater. A similar trend can be observed in the 
liquid detergent category---18% of households are channel loyal and 55% of households have a 
Channel Blurring Index greater than 0.4.  
These results indicate that there is a sizable segment of households who shop multiple outlets 
for a single category of goods. This fact is somewhat surprising. While it may expected that 
consumers will split their purchases across stores for their entire breadth of needs because no one 
store can stock all products, it is less likely that so many consumers would split their purchases of a 
single category across many types of outlets. Given this finding, I seek to understand the factors 
associated with retail format choice in the following section of this essay. 
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2.4 RETAIL FORMAT CHOICE MODEL 
2.4.1 Model 
 
In this section, I develop a model to examine the factors associated with retail format choice. To this 
end, the specification has the retail format decision as the dependent variable. As discussed in 
previous sections, consumers are in an environment where many types of stores carry similar breadth 
of assortment and must choose among competing formats on a given purchase occasion.  
 I specify a random utility model where the utility for a given format is specified at a 
household level. For format choice, the deterministic component of household h’s utility for format j 
for category c on shopping trip t is given by: 
     hjcthjctjchjct XU εβα ++=     (2) 
Where jcα is the format-category-specific constant, hjctε is the error term, and the variables of the 
matrix hjctX are: 
=hctQTYLag _  Category volume purchased by household h on last purchase occasion. 
=hctBrandLag _  Indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if a manufacturer’s brand was 
purchased on the last purchase occasion by household h and 0 if a retailer 
brand was purchased. 
=hctIPT   Interpurchase time in days since last category purchase by household h. 
=hjctFormatLag _  Effect of state dependence where this indicator variable takes the value of 1 if 
j was the last retail format where category purchase was made, and 0 
otherwise. 
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Price =hjctIndex  Trip weighted average category price for category c, in format j at time t. 
In the case of the quantity and brand variables, lag specifications were used to control for the 
endogeneity issue (e.g., Villas-Boas and Winer 1999). 
 The probability of format choice is given by the familiar multinomial choice model as 
follows:  
     
∑
=
J
hjct
hjct
hct U
U
jP
)exp(
)exp(
)(      (3) 
To capture household level format preferences, I estimate this model in a hierarchical 
Bayesian framework using a mixture of normals heterogeneity distribution. Details of the MCMC 
algorithm can be found in Rossi, Allenby and McCulloch (2005, Chapter 5).  
 This estimation procedure allows for a very flexible heterogeneity distribution, as the mixture 
of normals distribution can approximate many shapes very well. This method is highly appropriate 
for this analysis because I expect wide variation in format preference across households, some 
households with strong preference for a given format and other households with weak or no 
preference for that format. Additionally, the model allows for fixed effects so that observed sources 
of heterogeneity can also be modeled. The heterogeneity distribution of the coefficients is modeled 
as follows: 
     hhh uZ += δβ      (4) 
Where δ  are the coefficients for the fixed effects, and hZ is a mean-centered matrix of the following 
fixed effect variables: 
Gender: Proportion of shopping trips made by female shoppers in household h, 
HH_Size: Number of members in household h, 
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Dual Income: An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the household has two working adult 
members, 
Retired: An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the household has zero working adult 
members, 
Income: Household income level. 
hu is the heterogeneity distribution and the basis of this distribution is given as follows: 
     ),(~
hh indindh
N ∑µµ      (5) 
     )(~ pveclMultinomiaind Kh     (6) 
Where hind  is an indicator latent variable for the component from which household h is taken and it 
takes integer values 1 to K, K is the number of mixture components, and pvec is a vector of mixture 
probabilities of length K. 
 To estimate the posterior distribution of the parameters of the model, I made 50,000 draws 
with the MCMC algorithm. The first 25,000 draws were used as a burn-in period and the final 
25,000 were used for inference. An inspection of a plot of the log likelihood and parameters showed 
that steady state was reached by this point. Furthermore, I used defaults for priors where possible, 
except for the prior precision on the normal component means. As suggested in Rossi, Allenby and 
McCulloch (2005, p. 150), I used a prior precision of .0625 and standardized the non-indicator 
variables of the X matrix. This prior setting results in greater shrinking of household level 
parameters, which is a more conservative estimate that allows for the probability that households 
with short purchase histories may patronize formats not observed in the period of the data.  
 Moreover, the number of mixture components for the heterogeneity distribution must be 
specified. Since I model the heterogeneity distribution as continuous rather than as segments as is 
done in a finite mixture model (e.g., Kamakura and Russell 1989), the task is to include enough 
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components in the mixture to allow for adequate flexibility to fit the actual heterogeneity 
distribution. Hence, I do not need to run models with every possible number of components in the 
mixture to see where a selection criterion is minimized. Rather, I run models with both five and ten 
mixture components and find no appreciable difference in posterior estimates. Based on this 
analysis, I conclude that a five-component mixture is adequate to capture the unobserved 
heterogeneity. Thus, I report the results from the five component mixture.  
 
2.4.2 Results 
 
Model Comparison Results. Prior to presenting the coefficients and substantive results from the final 
model, I examine several alternative specifications for the retail format choice model. I examine two 
alternative models for each product category. Model 1 is a multinomial logit model without 
heterogeneity. Model 2 is a multinomial logit model with a normal heterogeneity distribution rather 
than a mixture of normals distribution. Model 3 is the full model with both observed sources of 
heterogeneity and a mixture of normals heterogeneity distribution. 
 I compare the models using three criteria: log marginal density, hit probability, and hit rate. 
Log marginal density is an in-sample criterion and hit probability and hit rate test the predictive 
ability of the model. I calculate the log marginal density using the approximation developed by 
Newton and Raftery (1994). I developed the predictive measures using the final two purchases of 
each household as a holdout sample. Hit probability is the mean probability of the chosen alternative 
in the holdout sample and hit rate is the proportion of instances in the holdout sample where the 
alternative with the highest probability is chosen by the household. 
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Table 3A 
Facial Tissue Model Fit 
Model Description 
In Sample Out of Sample 
Log Marginal 
Density* 
Hit 
Probability 
Hit 
Rate 
Multinomial Logit without Heterogeneity -9737.0 47.4% 59.2% 
Hierarchical Model with Normal Heterogeneity -6309.1 61.8% 68.8% 
Hierarchical Model with Mixture of Normals 
Heterogeneity -6256.7 63.5% 70.0% 
    
Table 3B 
Laundry Detergent Model Fit 
Model Description 
In Sample Out of Sample 
Log Marginal 
Density* 
Hit 
Probability 
Hit 
Rate 
Multinomial Logit without Heterogeneity -8160.8 40.4% 52.8% 
Hierarchical Model with Normal Heterogeneity -5046.4 56.5% 62.6% 
Hierarchical Model with Mixture of Normals 
Heterogeneity -4978.5 58.5% 64.2% 
* Calculated using the method of Newton and Raftery (1994)   
 
Tables 3A & 3B show the model fit statistics for the facial tissue and laundry detergent 
categories. Several results are consistent across both categories. First, the full model with fixed 
effects and mixture of normals heterogeneity is superior to the other specifications across both 
categories and all three criteria. Second, while the models with normal heterogeneity and mixture of 
normals heterogeneity perform similarly in-sample, the out-of-sample fit criteria show marked 
improvement when the mixture of normals distribution is used.  Third, the hit rate is relatively high 
for both the categories, underscoring the utility of the model specification in household level 
prediction. 
 Estimation Results.  Tables 4 and 5 report the hierarchical parameter estimates and their 
standard errors for the facial tissue and laundry detergent categories. Given the flexible nature of the 
model, the mean and standard error do not convey all of the information in the estimation procedure. 
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Therefore, I provide histograms of the household level retail format-specific parameters in Figures 3 
and 4. 
 For the estimation, I chose the grocery format as the base since it is the traditional format 
where these categories of goods are purchased. Interestingly, grocery still has a strong effect, as the 
drug, dollar and club coefficients are negative across both the product categories. Mass 
merchandisers have coefficients near zero, indicating that the preference for this format is not 
different from that for the grocery format.  The distributions of household-level parameters show 
that while the overall results indicate that the lower volume formats (drug, dollar and club) have 
negative preference coefficients, there are households with strong preference toward these formats. 
For example, the distribution of club coefficients shows that many households have highly negative 
coefficients for this format, but there is a small group that prefers this format. This finding likely 
reflects the split between households who have memberships at these clubs and those that do not. 
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Table 4 
Facial Tissue Estimation Results 
 
Intercept Gender HH_Size Dual Income 
Retired 
(Non-
Working) 
Income Category Volume 
Drug -1.99 -0.44 -0.46 -0.50 1.12 -0.11 -0.14 
 (0.30) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.06) (0.02) (0.01) 
Dollar -3.09 -0.08 0.25 0.40 0.02 -0.35 -0.99 
 (0.41) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) 
Mass 0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.00 -0.05 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Club -4.10 0.12 0.12 0.24 -0.57 0.19 0.29 
 (0.54) (0.08) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05) 
QTY_Drug 0.06 0.06 0.43 -0.36 0.23 -0.01 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
QTY_Dollar -0.27 -0.06 0.17 0.00 -0.36 0.09 -0.05 
 (0.05) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) 
QTY_Mass 0.15 -0.01 -0.25 -0.14 -1.09 0.29 -0.10 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
QTY_Club -0.21 0.09 -0.16 -0.49 0.98 0.26 2.24 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
Brand_Drug 0.03 -0.03 -0.09 0.04 0.23 0.00 0.05 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) 
Brand_Dollar -0.63 0.58 -1.08 -0.34 -0.54 0.06 0.15 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) 
Brand_Mass 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.55 0.91 -0.02 1.38 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
Brand_Club -0.04 -0.01 0.10 -0.09 -0.17 0.08 -0.07 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) 
IPT_Drug -0.34 0.18 -1.22 0.32 1.56 -0.31 -0.28 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.08) 
IPT_Dollar -0.38 -0.08 -0.16 0.08 -0.66 -0.26 -0.46 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) 
IPT_Mass 0.03 0.00 -0.33 -0.17 -0.03 -0.10 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.06) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) 
IPT_Club -0.31 0.13 -0.39 0.09 0.67 -0.12 -0.08 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
State Dependence 0.09 0.02 -0.45 -0.23 -0.57 0.02 0.53 
 (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Price -0.08 0.09 -0.14 0.03 1.11 0.00 0.02 
  (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) 
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Table 5 
Detergent Estimation Results 
 
Intercept Gender HH_Size Dual Income 
Retired 
(Non-
Working) 
Income Category Volume 
Drug -3.04 -1.72 -0.24 -0.13 0.24 -0.26 0.16 
 (0.32) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.06) (0.04) (0.02) 
Dollar -2.39 -0.05 0.28 1.61 -1.17 -0.84 0.84 
 (0.29) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) 
Mass -0.04 -0.15 -0.15 0.06 -0.05 0.07 -0.03 
 (0.05) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
Club -3.34 0.01 -1.18 0.16 -0.33 0.40 -0.18 
 (0.39) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) 
QTY_Drug -0.66 -0.06 -0.33 -0.25 0.73 -0.04 0.25 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
QTY_Dollar -0.36 -0.06 0.12 -0.04 0.17 -0.03 0.04 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
QTY_Mass 0.01 -0.33 1.16 -0.46 0.71 -0.07 0.12 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
QTY_Club -0.15 -0.07 0.32 -0.29 -1.07 0.48 -0.95 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) 
Brand_Drug 0.28 0.05 0.07 -0.01 0.28 -0.02 -0.06 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) 
Brand_Dollar -1.76 0.25 0.05 -0.99 0.18 0.19 -0.13 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Brand_Mass 0.00 0.03 0.04 -0.35 -1.00 0.51 -1.04 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
Brand_Club -0.52 0.04 -0.11 -0.02 0.06 -0.17 -0.03 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
IPT_Drug -0.49 0.26 -0.67 0.24 -0.47 -0.08 -0.09 
 (0.06) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
IPT_Dollar -0.51 0.03 -0.19 -0.11 -0.14 -0.28 1.64 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) 
IPT_Mass 0.01 0.12 -0.09 0.01 -0.29 0.03 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) 
IPT_Club -0.25 -0.22 -0.04 0.03 0.74 0.01 0.15 
 (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) 
State Dependence 0.26 -0.05 -0.17 -0.39 0.23 0.03 -0.01 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) 
Price -0.07 -0.09 -0.02 0.03 0.25 0.01 0.06 
  (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) 
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 The distribution of household-level coefficients for the mass merchandise format for facial 
tissue gives a better description of actual preference than the point estimate in Table 4. While the 
mean coefficient is 0.03, there are large portions of mass far away from zero, as the distribution 
appears to have two modes: one near -2 and one near 2. This result indicates that there are large 
portions of the market with strong preferences (positive and negative) for the mass merchandise 
format, which would not be evident from an analysis that did not take this heterogeneity into 
account. 
 The lag quantity coefficients show interesting results for the club format. Since club features 
the same products in larger quantities, buying a large quantity on a previous trip would intuitively 
suggest that a household may be more likely to buy from a club store on the next trip. Surprisingly, 
the results show the opposite trend as the average coefficient is negative (facial tissue coefficient = -
0.22, standard error = 0.04; detergent coefficient = -0.15, standard error = 0.04). This finding 
suggests that consumers may use the club format for large stock-up trips and use other formats to fill 
in between these trips. This pattern of behavior is also evident from the inter-purchase time 
coefficients, where shorter inter-purchase times are associated with a higher probability of a club 
store trip. This result is somewhat counterintuitive. If a household were exclusively using the club 
format, it would have a longer inter-purchase time due to the large quantities offered at club stores.  
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 Another interesting result that transcends the categories is the relative unimportance of state 
dependence. This is surprising in light of the fact that brand and SKU choice models typically show 
strong effects for state dependence (e.g., Seetharaman, Ainslie and Chintagunta 1999; Inman, Park 
and Sinha 2007). However, state dependence effects are often less pronounced when the effects of 
heterogeneity are modeled (Roy, Chintagunta, and Haldar 1996). The results show little importance 
for the last format utilized (facial tissue = 0.09; detergent = 0.26). Figure 5 shows that this result is 
true for the majority of households, as much of the mass of the distribution of household-level state 
dependence parameters is located close to zero. This finding adds to the growing evidence from the 
model that consumers view different formats as substitutes for the chosen categories. 
 The price coefficients from both categories are close to zero. This result suggests that most 
consumers do not choose retail format based upon weekly price fluctuations at retailers. This result 
could have occurred for one of several reasons. First, the cost of obtaining information across 
multiple retailers is both time and effort intensive. Second, consumers most likely form a price 
image based on more than one product category. This price image is, in turn, embedded in their 
preference for a given retail format. 
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 Demographic Effects. The effects of household level demographic characteristics are also 
reported in Tables 4 and 5. In this section, I focus on the effects of demographics on the retail format 
intrinsic value coefficients, as the demographics for the other coefficients offer less intuition into 
consumer behavior. 
 The results show that across categories retired or non-working households have a stronger 
preference for the drug format. This preference could be because this format is relatively convenient 
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and it carries an assortment that is important to this group of consumers. The convenience factor 
may play a role since drug stores have many more distribution points than formats such as club, and 
travel may be difficult for this group of consumers due to health (in the case of retired households) 
or transportation (in the case of non-working households) issues. Furthermore, the assortment 
offered at the drug format, which includes pharmaceuticals, may drive store trips for this group 
which could also explain the greater preference toward this format. More detailed data would need to 
be collected to determine the exact cause of this relationship. 
 In addition, I find that lower income households have a preference for the dollar format. This 
result is consistent with the descriptive analysis and is likely due to the fact that relatively low prices 
can be obtained in this format and there are a large and growing number of distribution points for 
consumers to frequent. 
Household-Level Results. I find that some households show preference toward multiple 
formats. For example, Household 50 utilizes four formats for each category and shows high 
preference for three formats in each category with coefficients of 0.67 (dollar), 0.21 (mass) -4.37 
(drug) and -6.17 (club) for facial tissue and -3.30 (dollar), 0.14 (mass), -0.18 (drug) and -9.98 (club) 
for detergent. Additionally, Household 187 utilizes both mass merchandisers and grocery stores for 
both categories, but doesn’t use any of the three other formats. This household has preference 
coefficients of -9.48 (dollar), -0.45 (mass) -4.35 (drug) and -3.87 (club) for facial tissue and -4.88 
(dollar), -.42 (mass), -8.87 (drug) and -6.00 (club) for detergent. Hence, there is evidence that some 
households have strong preference for multiple formats and utilize multiple types of stores for a 
particular category. This finding, together the high Channel Blurring Index for many households, 
suggests that it may be important to look at the characteristics of multi-format shoppers.  In the 
following section, I use the household level coefficients generated from the retail format choice 
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model with cross-sectional household level characteristics to examine their impact on the degree of 
channel blurring.  
2.5 MULTI-FORMAT SHOPPING MODEL 
 
While the previous section presents a model of the retail format choice decision for a given choice 
occasion, I also am interested in the factors associated with multi-format shopping behavior. I 
address this issue by examining the household level data in a cross-sectional analysis. To do this, I 
utilize the household-level coefficients generated from the retail format choice model as independent 
variables in the model to predict the degree of multi-format shopping. Because the coefficients for 
quantity, interpurchase time, and brand type provide estimates of how preferences change due to 
intertemporal factors, I do not use these coefficients in this stage. Instead, I provide cross-sectional 
measures for these factors as described below.  
 
2.5.1 Model 
 
I wish to study the degree of channel blurring at the individual level, so I estimate a model in which 
CBI is the dependent variable. I create a separate model for each category and estimate them as a 
system of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR). The model for the CBI of household h for 
category c is given as follows: 
     hchchc XCBI ηβα ++=     (6) 
where α is an intercept term and the variables of the hcX matrix are: 
HH Drug Coefficient:  Posterior mean drug coefficient from format choice model, 
HH Dollar Coefficient:  Posterior mean dollar coefficient from format choice model, 
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HH Mass Coefficient:    Posterior mean mass coefficient from format choice model, 
HH Club Coefficient:    Posterior mean club coefficient from format choice model, 
HH State Dep. Coef: Posterior mean state dependence coefficient from format choice 
model, 
HH Price Coefficient:    Posterior mean price coefficient from format choice model, 
Dual Income: An indicator variable which takes the value of one if there are two 
working adults in the household and zero otherwise, 
Retired:  An indicator variable which takes the value of one if there are zero, 
working adults in the household and zero otherwise, 
Household Size:  Number of members in household h, 
Household Income:    Household income level, 
% Male: The percent of shopping trips from the households that were done by 
males, 
% Private Label: Proportion of HH volume that was a retailer’s brand rather than a   
manufacturer’s brand, 
Brand Blurring Index: An index calculated in an analogous method to the Channel Blurring 
Index but with brands purchased rather than retail format utilized, 
IPT:  Average inter-purchase time for household h, 
Category Volume:  Quantity of category purchases in equivalent units, and 
η is an error term. 
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2.5.2 Results 
 
The results of the SUR analysis with CBI as a dependent variable are shown in Table 6.  The 
household-level demographic variables provide little intuition into the channel blurring 
phenomenon, as only Retired and Household Income are statistically significant and this finding 
holds for one category—laundry detergent.  
Table 6 
Multichannel Shopping Estimation Results 
 Facial Tissue Laundry Detergent 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error P-Value  Estimate 
Std. 
Error P-Value  
Intercept 0.770 0.081 <.0001 * 0.431 0.064 <.0001 * 
Dual Income 0.057 0.034 0.094  0.051 0.038 0.182  
Retired 0.057 0.031 0.072  -0.072 0.033 0.030 * 
HH Size -0.006 0.010 0.556  -0.016 0.014 0.253  
HH Income 0.001 0.001 0.174  -0.001 0.001 0.036 * 
% Shopping trips by Males -0.046 0.041 0.258  0.048 0.051 0.352  
% Private Label -0.154 0.041 0.000 * -0.264 0.081 0.001 * 
Brand Blurring Index  0.183 0.033 <.0001 * 0.148 0.035 <.0001 * 
Avg. Interpurchase Time 0.001 0.000 0.049 * 0.001 0.000 0.034 * 
Category Volume 0.000 0.000 0.092  0.000 0.000 0.146  
HH Drug Coefficient 0.038 0.006 <.0001 * 0.008 0.008 0.274  
HH Dollar Coefficient 0.031 0.006 <.0001 * -0.007 0.006 0.201  
HH Mass Coefficient -0.030 0.006 <.0001 * -0.013 0.006 0.050 * 
HH Club Coefficient 0.020 0.007 0.002 * -0.065 0.013 <.0001 * 
HH State Dependence Coefficient -0.109 0.014 <.0001 * -0.151 0.017 <.0001 * 
HH Price Coefficient -0.029 0.019 0.132   0.023 0.025 0.361   
 
The shopping behaviors and preference coefficients, however, provide more interesting results.  The 
mean interpurchase time, mass and club preference, state dependence, % private label, and Brand 
Blurring Index are significant across both categories. The mean interpurchase time results imply that 
longer interpurchase times are associated with higher levels of channel blurring. The results for the 
preference coefficients are mixed. For the mass merchandise format, greater preference is associated 
with lower levels of channel blurring. This finding suggests that consumers who have high 
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preference for this format use it as their primary format and are loyal to the format. This is also the 
case with the club format for laundry detergent. However, for the drug, dollar and club formats in the 
facial tissue category, high preference is associated with greater channel blurring. This result 
indicates that preference for these formats occurs together with preference for another format, which 
leads to greater channel blurring. 
 The results also indicate that the brand purchased has interesting results for channel blurring. 
First, I find that households who buy a greater proportion of their category requirement from private 
label brands engage in less channel blurring. This suggests that private labels may offer one avenue 
to build format or store loyalty. Second, I find that households who have greater dispersion of brand 
purchases also have a greater dispersion of format choices. This finding suggests that consumers 
who are less format loyal are also less brand loyal. This finding implies that loyalty may be a 
household level trait that extends beyond brands and into retail formats as well.  
Table 7 
Loyalty Analysis-% of Households 
 Facial Tissue 
Laundry 
Detergent 
Both 
Categories 
Brand and Format Loyal  3.8% 8.2% 1.0% 
Only Brand Loyal  10.6% 15.8% 4.4% 
Only Format Loyal  8.4% 9.8% 3.2% 
Neither Brand nor Format Loyal 77.2% 66.2% 91.4% 
  
To gain a deeper understanding of this result, I examine loyalty at the household level in 
Table 7. While on average, higher brand loyalty is associated with higher format loyalty, very few 
households are completely format and brand loyal across categories. In fact, only 1% of households 
buy the same brand in the same format on every purchase occasion for both categories. However, 
3.8% and 8.2% of households are completely format and brand loyal for the facial tissue and laundry 
detergent categories, respectively. This result implies a very simple decision process for these 
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households. Furthermore, 10.6% and 15.8% of households are brand loyal but not format loyal for 
the facial tissue and detergent categories, respectively. This result suggests that many households 
either have a preferred brand that they buy when needed regardless of location or that the household 
shops multiple formats to obtain their preferred brand at better prices. I also observe that 8.4% and 
9.8% of households are format loyal, but not brand loyal for facial tissue and laundry detergent, 
respectively. Thus, they are loyal to the format but respond to in-store marketing efforts or have a 
preference for variety. Finally, 77.2% of the facial tissue market and 66.2% of the laundry detergent 
market are neither brand nor format loyal, which implies that these are competitive categories for 
both retailers and manufacturers. 
 
2.6 DISCUSSION 
2.6.1 Summary 
 
Taken together, the results attempt to address the two research questions I posed at the beginning of 
the essay. The results show that household level heterogeneity in retail format preference explains 
much of retail format choice decision. Interestingly, many of the household-level preference 
distributions were multimodal, indicating wide variance in preference across households. The results 
also shed light on the profiles of households with preference for a particular format. Retired and non-
working households have greater preference for the drug format and lower income households prefer 
the dollar format.  
 Surprisingly, I find that the importance of state dependence is low. This result, along with the 
results from studying the intertemporal pattern of quantity and inter-purchase times, suggests that 
consumers use different formats as substitutes for one another. This finding has important 
implications for how retailers view competition. 
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 The analysis of the factors associated with the degree of channel blurring shows that 
shoppers who buy a greater proportion of private label goods tend to be more format loyal and 
engage less in channel blurring. This interesting result suggests that strong private label brands may 
enable lower competition among retailers. Furthermore, households who have a high degree of 
dispersion in brand purchases also have high Channel Blurring Indexes. This finding implies that 
loyalty is a household level trait and some consumers are habitually loyal while others look for good 
deals at the brand and retailer level. 
2.6.2 Implications for Marketers  
 
The results of this essay have important implications for marketers. First, retailers should consider 
using private label products as a way to build loyalty among its consumer base. It appears that there 
is a segment of consumers that uses private label brands in a way to shop in an efficient manner. 
They enjoy a low price associated with retailer brands without having to search across multiple 
stores to get a low price. Retailers who have a wide assortment of these goods may be able to attract 
and retain this group of customers. There is an opportunity for several formats in the categories 
examined, as both dollar and club formats have low share of private label brands sold in their outlets. 
Second, retailers should realize that competition is not just within format, as consumers use different 
formats as substitutes for one another. While most retailers are very aware of the threat posed by 
Wal-Mart Supercenters, competition is also growing in the form of dollar stores and warehouse 
clubs. Consequently, existing retailers should include an analysis of these cross-format  
competitors in their strategic planning efforts. Third, the results suggest that some consumers shop 
across formats to obtain better prices for goods, engaging in cherry-picking behavior. This finding 
suggests that loss-leader strategy aimed at generating store traffic should be used carefully.  
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 Furthermore, the results have implications for product manufacturers and marketers of 
national brands. First, on average, consumers who are loyal to retail formats are also more loyal to 
brands. Thus, manufacturers should try to create cooperative marketing plans with retailers where 
they have a strong position in an effort to best serve and maintain this strong relationship. I also find 
that about 10-15% of consumers are brand loyal but not format loyal. This result is important and 
should be studied in detail as it may imply that consumers are searching across formats to obtain the 
best price for a given brand. If this is the case, manufacturers should coordinate their marketing 
efforts across retailers in order to maximize their profits for this group.  
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 The results suggest that both retailers and manufactures can benefit from analysis of CBI in 
their markets. In Figure 6, I present a table of household loyalty types each of which requires 
different marketing actions. Both the categories have fairly large segments of households that I 
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consider to be habitually loyal--they buy the same brand in the same format. In categories where this 
segment is large, both manufacturers and retailers benefit from maintaining this business, so 
cooperative marketing campaigns could be undertaken through vehicles such as shared advertising 
or point-of-purchase coupons. However, the second largest group in each category is what I call 
opportunists. These consumers buy multiple brands in multiple formats, suggesting that they buy 
when they find an attractive deal. In categories where there are large groups of these consumers, 
competition is likely to be intense and the introduction of a retailer brand may be a good strategy as 
brand preferences do not appear to be that strong.  
 I also find a group of households who appear to have strong preference for one brand but are 
willing to buy it at multiple retail formats. This finding suggests that these consumers are willing to 
shop around for a better deal for their preferred brand. When a large segment of this type of 
consumer exists, the loss-leader strategy may be attractive, but could backfire due to cherry-picking.  
Finally, there are consumers who prefer a retail format, but are willing to buy multiple brands. These 
consumers respond to in-store marketing and in this case, manufacturers should adopt a push 
strategy by offering trade promotions to retailers. 
2.6.3 Implications for Consumers 
 
The results imply two strategies for consumers to obtain lower overall prices for their category 
requirements. The first strategy comprises shopping at one format and buying low-cost private label 
goods. This is effective because it involves low search costs, as obtaining information on weekly 
prices and promotions may be effort-intensive. The second strategy involves shopping at multiple 
formats and buying items when they are on promotion at lower prices. Greater research which 
strategy is more effective and what types of consumers engage in each strategy. 
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Because club stores and mass merchandisers offer relatively low prices, but have limited 
distribution points, I believe that lower income consumers may be disadvantaged in their ability to 
shop at value based formats. However, the retail format choice model and descriptive analysis show 
that the dollar format offers both low prices and attracts lower income consumers. This finding, 
together with the fact that dollar store distribution points are growing rapidly, suggests that 
consumers of all income strata are able to benefit from the increased competition in the retail 
industry.  
 
2.6.4 Limitations and Future Research 
 While this study provides a look into cross-format shopping among consumers, it is limited 
in that it only looks at two categories in one geographic market. Future research should examine 
whether there are category differences or differences across markets. The categories I examine are 
necessities which are relatively storable. Furthermore, differences in brand preferences across 
markets have been researched (Bronnenberg, Dubé, and Dhar 2007) and found to be important. 
Channel preferences will likely vary across markets as well. Additionally, the data were limited in 
the information available in the causal environment. It would be interesting to analyze data on 
advertising exposure to understand its effect on store trips. This research looks at cross-format 
shopping for a given category. Complementary research that examines within-format competition as 
well as across-format competition at the shopping basket level would be useful. It would also be 
interesting to study the dynamic effects of store competition to see how consumers’ utilization of 
different formats evolves as a function of store entry, changes in assortment, and new products.  
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3.0 ESSAY 2 
 
 
The Role of Price Image and Assortment in Determining Retail Chain Choice 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In the contemporary retail environment, consumers are faced with many retail options. As I show 
in the first essay of this dissertation, many households show a high preference for multiple 
retailers across different retail channels for a given category. But, how do households use these 
multiple retailers to obtain their whole breadth of needs?  
Existing work in marketing has examined the store choice decision at the household 
level. Bell and Lattin (1998) examine retailers of different price formats and show that large 
basket shoppers prefer EDLP over Hi-Lo stores. Fox, Montgomery and Lodish (2004) look at 
preference for different retailers and find that substitution is stronger within the grocery format 
than across retail formats. Briesch, Chintagunata and Fox (2008) show that while the preference 
for low prices is universal, assortment preferences vary across households. In this essay, I 
examine the role of price image and assortment to see how these factors play a role in store 
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choice and also examine the structure of competition among retailers. To this end, I 
conceptualize a model where consumers can purchase from multiple retailers in a given 
timeframe. Thus, I can examine whether the relationship among retailers is complementary, 
substitutable, or independent (e. g. Manchanda, Ansari, and Gupta 1999).  
In this essay, I seek to answer the following two research questions. (1) What factors are 
important in the retail chain choice decision? (2) Is the relationship among retailers 
complementary, substitutable or independent? In the following sections of this essay, I first 
develop the model that is estimated. This is followed by a description of the data and a 
presentation of the results. Finally, I discuss what these results imply for retailers and discuss 
future research opportunities.  
 
3.2 CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
 
The choice of which retail chains to patronize is a complex process that will likely be influenced 
by many factors. In the following section I briefly review the literature to develop a conceptual 
model for the retail chain choice decision.  
3.2.1 Basket Size and Composition 
 
The role of basket size has been studied previously in the marketing literature. Bell and Lattin 
(1998) find that large basket shoppers prefer the everyday low pricing format over stores that 
over more promotions. This effect of basket size is likely due to some underling phenomenon 
such as the price dispersion of the store. Bhatnagar and Ratchford (2004) study store choice 
across retail formats and find that the optimality of a format is dependent upon inventory holding 
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costs, among other things. Thus, preference for certain chains, such as wholesale clubs, may 
depend on a household’s desire and ability to inventory products.  
Additionally, the composition of the basket will influence the retail chain choice decision. 
Inman, Shankar and Ferraro (2004) show that categories are associated with certain retail formats 
which in turn leads consumers to purchase those categories in the associated format. While, 
many chains have overlapping assortment, considerable differences still exist in the focus of the 
assortment across retailers. Thus, basket size and composition will likely play a role in the chain 
choice decision. I develop an expected basket size measure that is used in the model to address 
this concept. It is measured for both food and non-food items to address the role of basket 
composition in the chain choice decision. 
 
3.2.2 Price 
 
Price will clearly be a factor in the chain choice decision. Given the rise of low cost retailers 
such as Wal-Mart, the retail market has become increasingly focused on price. But, what role 
will price play at the basket level. The role of price at the category level has been extensively 
studied (e.g., Guadagni and Little 1983). When choosing an item from a set of competing brands 
at this level, consumers can easily calculate the tradeoffs. However, at the basket-level the 
tradeoff becomes more difficult. Consumers are not exposed to competing prices without visiting 
other outlets, so price information is less readily available.  Additionally, the basket of goods that 
a consumer purchases is not static and will change from week to week. 
 Marketing academics have addressed this issue in previous studies. Bell, Ho, and Tang 
(1998) find that consumers can lower their variable cost (i.e. price) but pay higher fixed costs in 
terms of distance traveled and time needed to shop. Briesch, Chintagunta, and Fox (2008) model 
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the basked as a collection of categories that have a probability of being included in the 
subsequent shopping trip. Thus, the effect of price is built up from the category level. They find 
that the role of price is small compared to other factors such as assortment and convenience. 
 
3.2.3 Assortment 
 
Assortment plays an interesting role in the chain choice decision. Messinger and Narasimham 
(1997) argue that as time costs increase, a large assortment becomes more important. So, there 
may be a tradeoff between assortment and convenience. Briesch, Chintagunta, and Fox( 2008) 
find that  the less important assortment is to a consumer’s store choices, the more the consumer 
values convenience and vice versa. Additionally, self-report studies show that assortment is an 
important variable in the store choice decision (e.g. Arnold, Roth and Tigert 1981; Arnold, Oum 
and Tigert 1983). I include two measures of assortment in my model of retail chain choice: 
assortment breadth and depth. Addressing assortment in this manner allows me to examine the 
tradeoff between these two concepts that appears to exist in the marketplace. 
 
3.2.4 Convenience 
 
The density of stores within a chain as well as the location of households leads to an 
environment where chains differ in terms of their relative convenience to shoppers.  Bell, Ho and 
Tang (1998) explore the tradeoff between the fixed and variable costs of shopping and find that 
consumers minimize their total cost of shopping. In this conceptualization convenience, or lack 
thereof, is a fixed cost of shopping. Others have found an important role for convenience as well 
e.g. Arnold, Roth and Tigert 1981; Arnold, Oum and Tigert 1983). However, Singh, Hansen, and 
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Blattburg (2006) find that the effect of distance is quite small. I account for the effect of convenience 
in the model by including the distance to the closest outlet of a given chain.  
 
3.2.5 Habit 
 
Consumers will likely develop a habit over time and patronize the same chains as they learn 
about the price and assortment levels of each store. Brand and SKU choice models typically 
show strong effects for state dependence (e.g., Seetharaman, Ainslie and Chintagunta 1999; 
Inman, Park and Sinha 2007) and it is likely that this will play a role in chain choice as well. I 
include whether or not the chain was used in the previous time period as a variable in the model. 
  
3.3 MODEL 
 
3.3.1 Consumer Store Choice and Utility Function 
  
I consider a market in which there is a set of households (H) that purchase from a set of retail 
chains (J) and where household purchases are observed over a timespan (T). For each time 
period t, households must choose the retail chains from which they make their purchases. I let the 
indicator variable hjtD represent the choice of whether household h patronizes retail chain j in 
time period t as follows, 
   






=
otherwise0,
utilizedis jchainif,1
hjtD           (1) 
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Since consumers are uncertain about the environment that they will encounter when arriving at 
chain j, consumers will maximize their expected utility based upon the environment they 
anticipate they will encounter: 
hjthjthhjhtht
hfjthnjthnthfthjt
SDRMDistADAB
PPQQU
εβββββ
βββββ
+++++
+++++=
89876
54321
      (2) 
Where hftQ and hntQ is the demand for food and non-food items respectively for 
household h in period t, hfjtP  is the price image of food products needed at time t, hnjtP  is the 
price image of non-food products needed at time t, htAB  is the household-level assortment 
breadth requirement, htAD  is the household-level assortment depth requirement, hjDist is a 
measure of the distance to chain j for household h, hRM is a measure of how remote household h 
is, and hjtSD is a measure of state dependence for household h to chain j at time t. 
3.3.2 Consumer Purchase Quantity Decision 
 
 
I assume consumer weekly needs for food and non-food items are exogenously given and follow 
an auto-regressive process. Conceptualizing quantity in this way controls for the simultaneity 
problem where quantity may also be affected by the store choice decision. In order to determine 
how consumer demand influences store choice, I create an expression for the expected quantity 
of both food and nonfood products that will be required during the next shopping occasion. The 
quantity of food and non-food items needed are expressed as the following 
     hfthftffhft XQ ψδγ ++=            (3) 
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     hnthntnnhnt XQ ψδγ ++=                       (4) 
where fγ and nγ  are intercept coefficients, fδ and nδ  are estimated parameters, and the 
variables of the hftX  and hntX matrices are as follows: 
=htQLag _  Number of items (food items for matrix hftX  and nonfood for matrix 
hntX ) purchased during the last purchase occasion. 
Seasonality= Avg. Qty. of food or non-food items purchased by all households in a 
given week. 
HH_Size= Number of members in household h. 
Income= Annual income of household h. 
Inventory= Inventory level of food or non-food items for household h at time t. 
 
I model inventory using the normal recursive relationship (e.g., Gönül and Srinivasan 1996) as 
follows: 
   111 nConsumptio −−− −+= hthththt PurQtyInvInv   (5) 
Where separate inventory levels are estimated for food and non-food items, 1−htInv is the 
inventory level carried by household h at time t-1, 1−htPurQty is the number of items purchased 
by household h at time t-1, and 1nConsumptio −ht is the consumption by household h since time t-
1. I assume that consumption is constant and the inventory is bounded on the lower end at zero. 
I expect errors across equations (3) and (4) to be correlated because of random shocks at the 
household level that are unobserved in the data, thus I allow for these errors to be correlated by 
using a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimation. 
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3.3.3 Price Image 
 
Included in the utility function is the perceived price image of the retail chain. I model price 
image rather than simply including current price because in the context of retail chain choice, 
consumers will be uncertain about what prices they will encounter in a given chain due to price 
fluctuations over time and imperfect recall of prices prior to entering a store. To account for this, 
I let hjtPI denote the price image of household h for chain j at time t. The definition of price 
image is conditional on whether the chain was visited in a given week. If the chain was visited, I 
define price image as a weighted combination of the current period average basket price and the 
price image of the household at time t-1. If no chain visit was made, price image is not updated. 
The expression for price image is given as follows: 
jthjthjthjt PPIDPI )1()1(| 1 αα −+== −    (6) 
1)0(| −== hjthjthjt PIDPI  
The operationalization of price image in this manner is problematic for two reasons. First, 
because consumer baskets will differ across time, the average price may vary due to basket 
fluctuations rather than price fluctuations. Second, certain items may carry more weight in 
determining the price image of the store. I do two things to mitigate these issues. First, I mean 
center all items to the category weighted mean price. This will give a more accurate depiction of 
whether the basket price is indeed high or low, Second, I allow for separate price image 
processes for both food and non-food items to capture differences across categories. This will 
allow the test of whether food or non-food price-image has a greater role in determining store 
choice. 
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3.3.4 Assortment 
 
Given that retailers position themselves in the market in different formats with different types of 
assortment, I expect that the assortment level of a retailer will affect the probability of choice for 
that retailer. However, I do not have information on the store-level. I only have the observed 
purchase behavior of a subset of the stores’ customers. Using this information I could construct 
an assortment index based on what all of the customers in aggregate purchase but, this 
information is a noisy signal of the actual assortment of the store and is of little use. 
Given this, I create household level measures of assortment to see how household 
assortment requirements affect store choice. The two measures of assortment address two 
different types of requirements. The first measure is a measure of breadth of assortment. This 
measure is created by observing how many different categories a household purchases over the 
course of the dataset. The Homescan panel contains 1068 categories, and I normalize this 
construct so that the breadth of assortment ranges from 0 to 1.  
The second measure of assortment measures the depth of assortment that a given 
household uses. This measure is created by observing the total number of SKUs that a household 
purchases and then dividing that by the number of categories that were purchased. Households 
that utilize a greater number of SKUs per category could be engaging in variety seeking or 
simply be willing to use multiple SKUs in a substitutable manner. 
 
3.3.5 Distance 
 
Distance is an important variable in the model as it is a measure of how convenient the store is 
for a given household. In order to measure distance to retailers from households, I obtained the 
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geocode for each household and retailer in the market. Distance is then measured to each retailer 
by using the great circle distance formula, which is simply the distance measured from point to 
point on the Earth. Because many chains will have multiple retail outlets, I measure distance to 
the retailer as the closest outlet or the outlet utilized for that purchase occasion. 
I also include a second measure of distance in the model which is a variable that I call 
remoteness. This measure is included because I believe that distance will not simply influence 
choice in a linear manner. Rather, I observe that some households are not convenient to any of 
the stores that I examine and may behave differently than households in more populous areas.  
My point can best be considered through an example.  Household 1 who is 5 miles from Grocery 
#1 and 1 mile from Grocery #2 may strongly value the convenience of Grocery chain #2. 
However, Household 2, who is 20 miles from Grocery #1 and 25 miles from Grocery #2, may 
not consider distance to be as important as both stores are relatively inconvenient. Moreover, 
households who are more remote may have a preference for a retailer with certain characteristics 
such as a considerable breadth of assortment. Thus, the level of remoteness of a household may 
lead to a greater probability of choice for a given retailer. The remoteness measure is created by 
taking the minimum distance to any of the chains that are examined. 
3.3.6 State Dependence 
 
The model also includes a measure of state dependence to examine the effect of previous 
shopping behavior. I expect that where consumers shopped in previous weeks will have an 
influence on where consumers shop in the current period. This variable takes the value of 1 if the 
chain was patronized in the previous time period and is 0 otherwise.   
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3.3.7 Estimation 
 
For the estimation, I employ a simulated maximum likelihood method where I assume that the 
errors across models follow a multivariate normal distribution. This gives rise to a multivariate 
probit model. The probability that a household visits chain j at time t is given by the following 
equation: 
     )()1( hjthjt VDP Φ==     (7) 
WhereΦ is the cumulative standard normal distribution and hjtV  is the deterministic portion of the 
utility function hjtU . In the estimation procedure I allow the error terms to be correlated, making 
this a multivariate probit model and, the likelihood to be maximized it the following: 
   ∑∑∑
= = =
==
H
h
J
j
T
t
hjthjt DPLogDLogL
1 1 1
)]|1([*)( αα   (8)  
 
3.4  DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
The data for this study was obtained from the Nielsen Company and it comes from two of their 
products: Homescan and TD Linx. The Homescan panel tracks the purchases from over 125,000 
U.S. households across all retail outlets. For the current study, a subset of the data was used as 
the dataset is comprised of all panelist purchases from the Pittsburgh market for the years 2005-
2007. This dataset contains information about the overall basket size and composition at the 
department level as well as detailed information about each individual item that is purchased. 
Additionally, the data contains information about the demographics and location of the 
individual panelists.  
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The other portion of data comes from the Nielsen TD Linx dataset. This data contains 
comprehensive information about the store location, sales volume, physical characteristics, and 
departments within the stores. Using this information along with the Homescan panel, I can 
obtain precise distances to each store for each panelist. This is superior to many previous papers 
(e.g., Briesch, Chintagunta and Fox 2008) that operationalize distance using Zip Code centroids. 
Using these data sources, I am able to construct a complete purchase history of a given 
household across all retailers that sell the products of interest. The analysis utilizes data from a 
wide range of categories. All of the typical consumer staples like items from dry grocery non-
food item departments including items like toner cartridges for printers and kitchen gadgets are 
contained in the dataset. The dataset contains the purchase history of 582 panelists and represents 
over 250,000 store visits.  
 
3.5 RESULTS 
 
3.5.1 Store Patronage 
 
In Table 8, I include the percentage of houses that patronize each of the stores in a given week. 
The table shows the patronage level at the six chains that are included in the model, whose 
names are disguised in order to maintain confidentiality.  I examine one store from each format: 
grocery, mass merchandise, dollar stores, drug stores, and club stores as well as a second grocery 
store. A second grocery store is examined because the grocery market is more fragmented and 
represents a high proportion of the total sales for the dataset. The visits for these six chains 
represent 48% of the total trips in the market studied. 
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Table 8 
Households Visiting Each Chain 
Chain % of Households Making Trips in a Given Week 
Mass #1 32.9 
Grocery #1 31.3 
Grocery #2 12.6 
Dollar #1 9.8 
Drug #1 9.1 
Club #1 6.1 
 
3.5.2 Quantity Process 
 
Table 9 shows the results for the quantity process estimation. Overall the model predicts 
reasonably well as the system-weighted R2
The results for the non-food quantity process are substantively similar except that the 
effect of household size is smaller and the effect of income is now significant. These findings 
make sense as the effect of non-food items is different than the effect of food items. This is the 
 is 0.40. For the food quantity process, all predictor 
variables were significant except for the household income. This makes sense as greater income 
may not lead to a larger quantity of food items being purchased. The effect of income would 
likely lead to substitution to higher priced items rather than an increase in primary demand for 
food. Interestingly, the household inventory was positively associated with food demand. This is 
counterintuitive as one may expect that the level of food inventory would be negatively 
associated with demand. This may have occurred because this model is estimated across 
households and the inventory level is correlated with weekly average household purchase 
quantity. 
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case, because food items are affected by the ability to physically consume the product whereas 
non-food items are not. Thus, I would expect household size to have a smaller effect on quantity 
and income to now have a positive effect on the quantity of non-food items purchased. 
 
Table 9 
Quantity Process Estimation Results 
 
Food Non-Food 
  Parameter P-Value Parameter P-Value 
Intercept -9.305 <.0001 -3.430 <.0001 
Lag Quantity 0.069 <.0001 0.037 <.0001 
Seasonality 0.984 <.0001 1.033 <.0001 
Household Inventory 0.024 <.0001 0.007 <.0001 
Household Size 2.837 <.0001 0.675 <.0001 
Income 0.004 0.5663 0.020 <.0001 
  
 
3.5.3 Retail Chain Choice Results 
 
The results of the retail chain choice model estimation can be in Table 10. I will present the 
results in two sections. First, I will discuss the results of the individual chain estimations, and 
then I will examine the correlation structure of the error terms in the model to comment on the 
competitive relationship among firms. 
Grocery #1. The Grocery #1 results can be found in the first column of Table 3. The 
estimation shows that all of the independent variables except remoteness and food price image 
significantly affect the probability of a store visit. Among all stores that I study, it appears that 
distance has the greatest impact on store visits for this chain. I calculated simulated probabilities 
from the model parameters to quantify the impact of each independent variable because of scale 
differences across variables. In doing so, I find that households that are 5 miles from Grocery 
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Chain #1 have a 55% probability of a store visit and that this probability drops to 48% when the 
distance is increased to 10 miles. 
The biggest impact on store visits is the state dependence variable. The probability of a 
store visit is 55% if the chain was visited in the previous time period but this probability drops to 
only 24% if the chain was not visited in the previous week. Other interesting findings for this 
chain were the assortment variables. I found that households that preferred greater depth in 
assortment were relatively likely to visit grocery stores but those households who preferred 
greater breadth of assortment were less likely to visit Grocery Chain #1. This is a 
counterintuitive finding given that this chain does have a considerable breadth of assortment as 
defined by the Nielsen categories. A complete list of the simulated probability studies can be 
found in Table 11. 
Grocery #2. The results of Grocery Store #2 differ from Grocery Store #1 in several 
important ways. First, the food price image is now statistically significant and important. Table 
11 shows that if the food price image is -1 the probability of a store visit is 55% but if the food 
price image increases to 1, the probability of a store visit drops to 21%. Also, like Grocery Chain 
#1, households with a greater breadth requirement have a greater probability of a store visit, but 
unlike Grocery chain #1, households who utilize less of the assortment depth, on average, have a 
greater probability of a chain visit. Like all chains, the state dependence variable is important. If 
the chain was not patronized in the previous week, the probability of a chain visit is only 2% but 
this probability increases to 24% if a chain visit was made. 
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Table 10 
Chain Choice: Estimation Results 
 
Grocery #1 Grocery #2 Mass Merch #1 Drug #1 Club #1 Dollar #1 
  Parameter P-Value Parameter P-Value Parameter P-Value Parameter P-Value   Parameter P-Value Parameter P-Value 
Intercept -0.156 0.543 
 
-0.406 0.009 
 
-1.628 <.0001 
 
-1.635 <.0001 
 
-1.737 <.0001 
 
-0.665 <.0001 
 Predicted Food Quantity 0.023 <.0001 
 
0.020 <.0001 
 
0.014 <.0001 
 
-0.012 <.0001 
 
0.002 0.474 
 
0.009 0.001 
 Predicted Non-Food Quantity 0.010 0.011 
 
0.036 <.0001 
 
0.024 <.0001 
 
0.041 <.0001 
 
0.028 <.0001 
 
-0.010 0.048 
 Food Price Image -0.153 0.102 
 
-0.454 <.0001 
 
-0.174 <.0001 
 
-0.038 0.017 
 
-0.035 0.071 
 
-0.453 <.0001 
 Non-Food Price Image -0.040 0.020 
 
-0.026 0.000 
 
-0.013 0.203 
 
0.020 0.003 
 
-0.025 <.0001 
 
-0.040 0.298 
 Assortment Breadth -1.756 <.0001 
 
-1.789 <.0001 
 
1.045 <.0001 
 
-2.209 <.0001 
 
1.990 <.0001 
 
-0.118 0.701 
 Assortment Depth 0.112 <.0001 
 
-0.074 0.000 
 
-0.086 <.0001 
 
0.201 <.0001 
 
-0.215 <.0001 
 
-0.008 0.743 
 Distance -0.036 <.0001 
 
-0.009 <.0001 
 
-0.001 0.102 
 
-0.006 <.0001 
 
-0.002 0.065 
 
0.000 0.655 
 Remoteness -0.001 0.127 
 
-0.005 0.043 
 
0.010 <.0001 
 
0.000 0.421 
 
0.000 0.650 
 
-0.006 <.0001 
 State Dependence 0.840 <.0001   1.378 <.0001   0.628 <.0001   0.802 <.0001   0.262 <.0001   1.269 <.0001   
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Table 11 
Simulated Probabilities 
 
Groc 
#1 
Groc 
#2 
Mass 
#1 
Drug 
#1 
Club 
#1 
Dollar 
#1 
P(Trip|Food Basket =20)       0.59  
      
0.21  
      
0.18  
      
0.21  
      
0.08        0.18  
P(Trip|Food Basket=10)       0.50  
      
0.16  
      
0.15  
      
0.24  
      
0.08        0.16  
P(Trip|Non-Food Basket =10)       0.59  
      
0.21  
      
0.18  
      
0.21  
      
0.08        0.18  
P(Trip|Non-Food Basket=5)       0.57  
      
0.16  
      
0.15  
      
0.15  
      
0.06        0.20  
P(Trip|Food Price Image=1)       0.59  
      
0.21  
      
0.18  
      
0.21  
      
0.08        0.18  
P(Trip|Food Price Image=-1)       0.71  
      
0.55  
      
0.29  
      
0.23  
      
0.09        0.50  
P(Trip|Non-Food Price Image=1)       0.59  
      
0.21  
      
0.18  
      
0.21  
      
0.08        0.18  
P(Trip|Non-Food Price Image=-1)       0.62  
      
0.23  
      
0.19  
      
0.19  
      
0.09        0.20  
P(Trip|HH Uses 40% of Categories)       0.55  
      
0.24  
      
0.20  
      
0.15  
      
0.12        0.18  
P(Trip|HH Uses 20% of Categories)       0.68  
      
0.36  
      
0.15  
      
0.28  
      
0.06        0.19  
P(Trip|HH Uses 4 SKUs/Categories)       0.59  
      
0.21  
      
0.18  
      
0.21  
      
0.08        0.18  
P(Trip|HH Uses 2 SKUs/Categories)       0.51  
      
0.26  
      
0.23  
      
0.11  
      
0.17        0.19  
P(Trip|Distance=5 Miles)       0.55  
      
0.24  
      
0.20  
      
0.15  
      
0.15        0.18  
P(Trip|Distance=10 Miles)       0.48  
      
0.22  
      
0.20  
      
0.15  
      
0.15        0.18  
P(Trip|Remoteness =20 miles)       0.59  
      
0.19  
      
0.22  
      
0.21  
      
0.08        0.16  
P(Trip|Remoteness=10 miles)       0.59  
      
0.21  
      
0.19  
      
0.21  
      
0.08        0.17  
P(Trip|Trip Last Week)       0.55  
      
0.24  
      
0.20  
      
0.15  
      
0.12        0.18  
P(Trip|No Trip Last Week)       0.24  
      
0.02  
      
0.07  
      
0.03  
      
0.07        0.02  
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 Mass Merchandiser #1. The results of the Mass Merchandiser #1 estimation show that all 
factors are statistically significant except for distance and non-food price image. The effect of 
distance is interesting. If a model is estimated without the remoteness variable, the effect of 
distance was actually positive and statistically significantly. I surmised that this was because 
households that were not close to any of the chains were using mass merchandiser #1 as a source 
for a large proportion of their baskets. Thus, because competitive distances were not in the 
model, the model captured this effect via a positive relationship for the distance parameter. A 
parsimonious way to capture the effect of competitive distances was to include the remoteness 
variable in the model. When this variable was included, the effect of distance became negative 
and nonsignificant, and the remoteness variable was positive and significant. The effect of 
remoteness was such that households who were 10 miles from any of the chains had a 19% 
probability of a store visit and households who were 20 miles from any of the chains had a 22% 
probability of visiting mass merchandiser #1. 
 The assortment variables were also interesting for mass merchandiser #1. Households 
that had utilized a wider breadth of assortment but less depth of assortment had a higher 
likelihood of patronizing mass merchandiser #1. This is in line with the strategy of typical mass 
merchandisers, especially in the age of the supercenter concept, as many of these firms carry 
many product categories at the expense of category depth. The assortment variables were 
relatively important as households that used 40% of the breadth of categories had a 20% 
probability of a chain visit while those households who used only 20% of the breadth of 
assortment had a 15% probability of store visit. For the assortment depth variable, households 
who used an average of 4 SKUs/category had an 18% probability of store visit while those that 
used only 2 SKUs/category had a 23% probability of store visit. 
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  Drug #1. All of the independent variables except remoteness are statistically significant 
for Drug Chain #1. One interesting trend is that Drug Chain #1 attracts households with a smaller 
food basket requirement. This is the only chain where this is the case. All else equal, you might 
expect households with greater requirements to make more visits to all chains. However, 
presumably due to the positioning or assortment of Drug Chain #1 households with smaller food 
requirements visit Drug Chain #1 with greater probability. The probability that a household with 
an expected food demand of 10 items would have 24% probability of visiting the chain whereas 
a household with an expected food demand of 20 items would have 21% probability of a chain 
visit. 
The effect of assortment on the patronage probability of Drug Chain #1 is such that the 
households with lower breadth requirements but greater depth requirements visit the chain with 
greater probability. Households that utilize 40% of the assortment breadth have a 15% 
probability of store visit while those that utilize 20% of the assortment breadth have a 28% 
probability of store visit. For assortment depth, households that use 4 SKUs/category on average, 
have a 21% probability of a chain visit while those households that use 2 SKUs/category on 
average have only an 11% of chain visit. 
Club #1. For Club Chain #1, non-food basket size, non-food price image, the assortment 
variables and state dependence were statistically significant. Interestingly, neither of the food 
variables or distance variables were statistically significant. Thus, it appears that within the 
context of this market, distance was not an important factor for the club chain. Consistent with 
the strategy of many club stores, households that utilize greater category breadth but lower 
category depth had a greater probability of visiting this chain. Households that used 40% of the 
category breath had a 12% probability of a chain visit while those that used 20% of the breadth 
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only had a 6% probability of a chain visit. Households that used an average of 4 SKUs/category 
had an 8% chance of chain visit whereas those that used 2 SKUs/category had a 17% probability 
of store visit. 
The other factor that had a large impact on chain visit was state dependence where 
households that visited the chain in the previous week had a 12% probability of a chain visit but 
those who hadn’t visited the chain only had an 8% probability of a chain visit. While this is a 
relatively large shift in probability, it appears smaller than most of the other chains. This may be 
due to the fact that the frequency of visit to club stores is less and a one week lag may not 
capture this effect entirely. 
 Dollar #1. Food and non-food basket size, food price image, remoteness, and state 
dependence were the statistically significant factors for Dollar Chain #1. Interestingly, neither of 
these assortment variables were significant for this chain in contrast to the other five chains. 
However, the effect of food price image and state dependence appears to be somewhat large. 
Instances where the food price image was -1 showed that the household had a 50% probability of 
a chain visit but when the food price image was 1, the probability dropped to 18%. Also, if the 
chain was visited in the previous week, the probability of a visit was 18% while when no chain 
visit was made, the probability of a chain visit dropped to 2%. 
Competition Structure. By examining the error term structure of the multivariate probit 
model, the nature of the competition among firms that I studied can be examined. I classify the 
competition into three different groups:  substitutes (negative correlation), complements (positive 
correlation), and independent (non-significant correlation). Table 12 contains the results of this 
analysis. 
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Two sets of chains have substitutable relationships: Mass Merchandiser #1–Drug #1 and 
Mass Merchandiser #1—Grocery #1. Additionally, Drug #1 and Grocery #1 have a 
complementary relationship. This set of results suggests an interesting competitive structure as 
some households use Grocery #1 in conjunction with Drug #1 to fill out their baskets while other 
households replace both of these chains with Mass Merchandiser #1. Based on the other 
coefficients from the estimation, it appears that those who prefer depth may use a combination of 
the Grocery #1 and Drug Chain #1 while those who prefer breadth and perhaps one-stop 
shopping use Mass Merchandiser #1. These insights suggest ways for these retailers to expand or 
reduce their assortment. 
Drug Chain #1 and Grocery #2 have complementary relationships with several other 
chains. It appears that these chains often are used in conjunction with other chains are not used to 
obtain a households entire breadth of needs.  These results suggest that these chains do not fill 
the role as the primary source for most households. Rather, people are using them to fill some 
other role such as to exposure to greater assortment or promotional pricing opportunities. 
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Table 12 
Competitive Relationship 
Correlation Parameter P-Value Relationship 
#1 Grocery-#2 Grocery 0.02 0.240 Independent 
#1 Grocery-#1 Mass -0.04 0.010 Substitutes 
#1 Grocery-#1 Drug 0.10 <0.001 Complements 
#1 Grocery-#1 Club -0.03 0.304 Independent 
#1 Grocery-#1 Dollar 0.03 0.179 Independent 
#2 Grocery-#1 Mass 0.07 <0.001 Complements 
#2 Grocery-#1 Drug 0.08 0.002 Complements 
#2 Grocery-#1 Club -0.01 0.605 Independent 
#2 Grocery-#1 Dollar 0.01 0.691 Independent 
#1 Mass-#1 Drug -0.11 <0.001 Substitutes 
#1 Mass-#1 Club 0.17 <0.001 Complements 
#1 Mass-#1 Dollar 0.03 0.141 Independent 
#1 Drug-#1 Club -0.02 0.519 Independent 
#1 Drug-#1 Dollar 0.06 0.037 Complements 
#1 Club-#1 Dollar -0.05 0.118 Independent 
 
 
3.6 DISCUSSION 
3.6.1 Summary and Generalizations across Chains 
 
In this essay, I examine the factors that affect the retail chain choice at the household level for 
the household’s entire basket of needs. I estimated a multivariate probit model to quantify the 
role that various factors play in this decision. The model was estimated at the chain level and the 
following generalizations can be observed from the model: 
• State dependence has the largest impact on trip probability across chains. 
• Food price image has a bigger impact than non-food price image for most chains. 
• The impact of assortment across chains varies in interesting ways. 
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• Distance plays a small role in the chain choice process. 
• With a few exceptions, households with larger requirements have a higher 
probability of trips to the various chains. 
I found that many factors were important in the chain choice decision but the role of state 
dependence was the largest factor for most chains. This seems to suggest that habit is an 
important factor in the chain choice decision. Interestingly, food price image played an important 
role in the choice decision for most chains but non-food price image was often of smaller 
magnitude. This suggests that the price of food plays a bigger role in the store choice decision 
and this may have implications for pricing strategy. 
The role of assortment varies in interesting ways across chains. The mass merchandiser 
and club store attract customers who use a greater breadth of assortment but less depth in 
assortment. This is consistent with the strategy typically employed by these types of stores. For 
the drug chain and grocery chain #1 households who use a greater level of depth but use a lower 
level of breadth have a greater probability of a store visit. This too may have implications for 
these retailers as many grocery and drug stores are expanding breadth of their assortment and 
need to be careful not to jeopardize their current customer base if they sacrifice depth to achieve 
this breadth. 
Interestingly, distance plays a small role for all chains except Grocery #1. This suggests 
the relative unimportance for convenience in the chain choice decision. Future research should 
examine this further to see if a better conceptualization of distance could better explain the role 
of convenience. I only observe where the households live not where they work or other factors 
that may explain why a chain may be convenient to the household. Finally, I find that households 
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with larger demand for food or non-food items typically have a greater probability of a chain 
visit. 
3.6.2 Implications for Marketers 
 
This research provides several interesting implications for the retail industry. First, I believe the 
fact that food price image plays a greater role in chain choice than non-food price image is an 
important insight for retailers. This may mean that food prices matter more to consumers or that 
they are easier to compare across retailers. Either way, promotions and low prices should be 
utilized for food categories rather than non-food categories to help drive store traffic. Non-food 
prices may be less important and could be higher to maximize profits. 
 Second, the assortment results suggest ways for retailers to expand or trim their 
assortment to satisfy their customer base. If a given chain’s customers prefer greater depth rather 
than breadth, assortment decisions can be made accordingly. Clearly, other considerations such 
as category profitability will drive this as well, but these results could provide additional 
information. 
 Finally, an analysis such as this could be useful for retailers to discovery which firms 
they are in competition with and which firms are used in a complementary fashion with their 
chain. Knowing this information could provide a firm with data detailing how to compete with 
the other chains. If a chain is a substitute for your chain, you may want to develop a plan to 
attract the customers directly from that firm.  However, knowing a firm has a complementary 
relationship with your firm may also provide insights for competition. You could study why this 
relationship exists and examine what role that firm is providing for your customers that you are 
not. If this can be discovered, additional opportunities could be created with existing customers. 
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3.6.3 Future Research  
 
While this essay provided some interesting initial insights into the retail chain choice decision, 
future research should be done in this area to add to these results. First, future research should 
incorporate heterogeneity into models of the chain choice decision. A model that estimates latent 
segments or a continuous representation of heterogeneity may provide additional insights into 
whether differences in the importance of the variables exist across households. 
 Second, research should be done to see how consumers arrange their trips in a temporal 
manor. For example, if multiple trips are made in one week, are they all on the same day and in a 
similar location. This line of research may further explain the role of convenience in the chain 
choice decision and may be particularly important in light of the recent increase in energy costs. 
 Finally, research into role of assortment should be undertaken to see if certain types of 
categories have more importance in the chain choice decision. This may provide some insight to 
retailers to help them expand their assortments in the ongoing channel blurring phenomenon. The 
retail environment continues to evolve over time and should be a fruitful research area for many 
years.  
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4.0  ESSAY 3 
 
 
 
Is the Robinson-Patman Act Dead? 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The Robinson-Patman Act (the RP Act) was passed in 1936 in order to combat a new and 
growing threat to the independent retailer: the chain store. In essence, the act prohibits suppliers 
from discriminating in price among competing buyers and buyers from knowingly receiving 
discriminatory prices. While there are defensible forms of price discrimination, the act was put in 
place to protect independent retailers from the significant buying power of the larger chain 
stores. Given the existence of this statute, I would expect that the retail environment would 
continue to have strong independent retailers competing with chain stores. However, this is not 
the reality that is observed.  
The current environment is such that large chains are dominating across all types of 
retailers. Examples of this supremacy can be seen in formats like grocery stores, which are 
dominated by chains like Kroger’s, Publix and now Wal-Mart, and also drug stores where large 
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chains like CVS, Walgreen’s, and Rite-Aid have a large market share. The relative power of 
chains can be best seen in drug stores where the total store count declined by 8% from 1997-
2002 but the store count of the three largest chains increased by 44%. Additionally, grocery 
stores have seen a considerable concentration of power as well. In 1997 the top 4 chains had 20.4 
% of the store count and this increased to 32.5% in just 5 years5
When the RP Act was enacted the prevailing populist attitude was that protecting small 
businesses from larger chain stores was an important goal. Over time, that attitude has changed 
and with it, the meaning of competitive harm under the RP Act. Originally, competitive harm 
meant showing that a competitor was injured. Thus, if price discrimination led to a company 
going out of business or losing profits due to declining market share, competitive harm could be 
proven.  However, this interpretation changed over time and ultimately a new standard for 
proving competitive harm was formed in the Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson
. 
 Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that firms are using their size to pressure 
suppliers to achieve lower input prices.  One prominent contemporary example is Wal-Mart, who 
is currently the largest retailer in the United States. While much of its growth in power has been 
attributed to its logistical and operational efficiency, suppliers also suggest that Wal-Mart uses its 
size to gain better prices (Facenda 2004). Wal-Mart expects and gets the lowest price in the 
market and suppliers trying to do otherwise may suffer dire consequences (e.g., Useem 2003; 
Smith 2002). In this essay, I seek to understand why THE RP ACT is failing to meet its intended 
goal and whether it is still relevant to business practitioners.  
6
                                                 
5 Data from 1997 & 2002 U.S. Economic Censuses and Company Annual Reports 
6 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. (92-466), 509 U.S. 209 (1993) 
 case which 
was decided in 1993. In this case, the Supreme Court made clear its interpretation of the Act and 
heightened the standard for showing competitive injury for plaintiffs seeking damages. 
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After Brooke Group, showing competitive harm requires showing that a rival priced 
below their costs and had a reasonable prospect of recouping their investment in below cost 
pricing.  To show that a firm recouped their investment in below cost pricing, plaintiffs must 
show that as a consequence of the price discrimination consumers ultimately pay higher prices. 
Recoupment could occur in any market but one scenario where recoupment is likely is if the 
price discrimination drives a competitor from the market and a monopoly is created. Then, the 
surviving competitor can raise prices and enjoy monopoly profits. Thus, competitive harm no 
longer means harming a competitor, it means harming the consumers of the goods.  This ruling 
clarified the government’s position on the RP Act and made the act more consistent with other 
antitrust statutes such as the Sherman Act. However, in doing this, it seems the Supreme Court 
has made gaining relief under the act much more difficult; thereby leading us to question 
whether the act is still relevant to businesses. 
It is within the context of this environment that I examine the Robinson-Patman Act to 
quantify how the changes in the legal interpretation of the Act affect the outcome of cases in 
federal court. While other scholars have examined the effect of the Brooke Group ruling from a 
legal perspective (e.g. Baker 1994; Denger and Herfort 1994), to my knowledge, this is the first 
attempt to empirically examine the effect of the ruling, quantifying the actual risk faced by 
businesses with the goal of explaining how the Brooke Group ruling affects case outcome. 
 To this end, I collect data on the outcome of the RP Act cases in the federal court system 
for 25 years from 1982 to 2006. I use this data to estimate a model where I empirically examine 
whether the likelihood of success for plaintiffs has decreased following the Brooke Group ruling.  
I account for other factors that may explain the relative success of plaintiffs by including 
characteristics of plaintiffs and defendants as well as characteristics from the case.  Additionally, 
79 
 
I include a structural break in the model’s parameters following the Brooke Group v. Brown & 
Williamson Supreme Court ruling which allows us to study how the effect of case characteristics 
changes in the aftermath of this ruling. From this analysis, I find evidence that the Brooke Group 
ruling significantly decreased the probability of a plaintiff winning a Robinson-Patman case. The 
decrease in probability is particularly evident in primary-line Robinson-Patman cases and cases 
where the defense brought up the issue of competitive harm. Additionally, I find the importance 
of plaintiff resources changes after the Brooke Group ruling. While small plaintiffs are 
significantly more successful than large plaintiffs before Brooke Group, this result reverses 
afterward and large plaintiffs do better than their small counterparts.  
Much has been written about the RP Act since its passage in 1936. Economists and 
antitrust lawyers have long debated the merits of and problems with the RP Act. For example, 
early discussions address whether the RP Act is pro- (Posner 1976) or anti-competitive (Bork 
1978; 376-410). Economists have also examined the implications of the RP Act for welfare 
distribution and market efficiency. Ross (1984), for example, empirically argues that the RP Act 
may have harmed grocery chains without any benefit to other firms. Katz (1987) and O’Brien 
and Shaffer (1994) theoretically measure the welfare effects of prohibiting price discrimination 
in intermediate goods markets, such as wholesale. These writings have focused on the RP Act 
from the perspective of antitrust economics. As such, they attempt to resolve, in a broad sense, 
whether the RP Act is good for economic efficiency.  
The marketing literature has previously examined the implications of antitrust law for 
channel management. In particular, the discriminate use of slotting allowances has been a subject 
of debate (e.g., Bloom, Gundlach, & Cannon 2000; Sudhir & Rao 2006). Some authors argue 
that prohibiting retailers from charging slotting allowances can be viewed as a means of leveling 
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the playing field for smaller competitors (Gundlach & Bloom 1998). Sullivan (1997) suggests, in 
contrast, that the use of slotting fees is not anticompetitive. 
While most marketing practitioners and academics are aware of the RP Act, little work in 
marketing has been done. Stevens (1937), in an early Journal of Marketing article, offers support 
for the RP Act and argues that obtaining lower input prices by negotiating with suppliers is 
unfair competition and that competitive advantage should be gained through production 
efficiency not size. Tarpey (1972) examines several FTC cases to assess the legal liability of 
buyers who bargain for preferential prices under the RP Act. Marks and Inlow (1988) study U.S. 
District Court actions under the RP Act from 1961 to 1986 to discern patterns in the practice of 
price discrimination, with a focus on the impact of the RP Act on small business. Spriggs and 
Nevin (1994) analyze functional discounts and suggest that authorities should be conscious of 
their pro-competitive effects. This essay, in contrast to much previous work, does not attempt to 
discuss the merits of or anti-trust laws in general. Rather, I take the law as a given reality and 
quantify how the law has changed after the landmark Brooke Group ruling.  
An examination of this issue is important to marketers for several reasons. First, my 
findings will have implications in how marketers set their prices. The current interpretation of 
the RP Act may mean that it is better to maximize profits rather than to avoid price 
discrimination. I am not advocating breaking the law, rather, the current view is that price 
discrimination is good for competition when it leads to lower consumer prices. Second, 
marketing educators should examine how they present the RP Act in their courses. Most 
introductory marketing textbooks include a section about the Act and simply give the advice that 
price discrimination is illegal. This advice may train managers to be risk averse in their pricing 
policies. Finally, my findings have implications for those companies who are contemplating 
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pursuing a Robinson-Patman case. Because I find that the relative success of plaintiffs differs 
under different scenarios, marketers should use this information to help decide whether a 
Robinson-Patman case is a worthwhile investment.  
In the following sections of this essay, I first provide a brief description of the RP Act 
and what is prohibited by the Act. Then I review the history of the act to provide a rationale for 
why I think that the act is declining in importance and how the Brooke Group ruling has affected 
case outcomes. Next, I provide a justification for the model specification and formally test how 
the Brooke Group ruling has affected the outcome of RP Act cases. Finally, I conclude with 
discussion of the results and the implications for marketers and marketing academics. 
 
 
4.2 SUMMARY OF WHAT THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT FORBIDS 
 
The RP Act has been criticized for its lack of focus, obscure language and excessive discretion to 
the FTC without guidelines for enforcement (Edwards 1959). As a result, a simple reading of the 
statement of the Act does not provide a sharp description of what practices are forbidden.  
The first major section of the Act is section 2(a) which prohibits sellers from engaging in 
price discrimination when the buyers are competitors themselves. A typical case under 2(a) 
involves a supplier offering discounts to a price sensitive intermediary that is not available to 
other competitors. Franchisors who sell to independents as well as to franchisees may have a 
strong incentive to discriminate in this way, for example. Because independents are not typically 
contractually bound to their supplier, they are free to shop for the cheapest price, a privilege not 
available to the franchisee. An examination of twenty-five years (1982-2006) of case history 
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showed that the vast majority (82.2%) of cases had allegations falling under section 2(a)7
Another major section of the Act is section 2(f) which states that it is unlawful for a 
person in commerce to knowingly induce or receive discrimination in price. In this case, the 
buyer will violate section 2(f) only if she knew that the seller was offering terms that violate 
section 2 (a).
. This 
high percentage is likely due to the fact that price discrimination is essentially forbidden in this 
part of the Act. Accordingly, whenever an action is brought under any section of the Act, it also 
often involves section 2(a). 
8  For example, Wal-Mart has been accused of knowingly inducing its suppliers to 
offer discounts which are not available to smaller retailers.9
Although the RP Act was enacted to prevent price discrimination, engaging in price 
discrimination, per se, is not a violation of the act. There are certain jurisdictional requirements 
 . Interestingly, only 10.1% of the 
cases contained allegations under section 2(f). This low percentage may reflect the difficulty to 
prosecute section 2(f) cases, because to be liable under this section, the requirements for a 
section 2(a) violation must also be established.  
Sections 2(c), 2(d), and 2(e) prohibit sellers and buyers from using brokerage, 
allowances, and services to accomplish indirectly what sections 2(a) and 2(f) directly prohibit 
(Clark 1995). Section 2(c) prohibits a seller from paying to or receiving from a buyer anything of 
value as a commission, brokerage fee or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in 
lieu thereof, except for services rendered. Sections 2(d) and 2(e) prohibit a seller from granting 
advertising and promotional allowances or services to a buyer unless these allowances or 
services are made available to all buyers. Sections 2(c), (d) and (e) were present in 18.4, 7.4 and 
10.1 percent of the cases, respectively. 
                                                 
7 A given case may involve multiple sections. 
8 See for example, A&P vs. FTC, 440 U.S. 69, (1979). 
9 See Tires Inc. of Broward v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 295 F. Supp. 2d 1349 (S.D. Fla. 2003). 
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that must be fulfilled in order for the price discrimination to fall under the RP Act. These 
requirements are statements written into the act that must be fulfilled in order to have a case for 
which the RP Act applies. While the requirements are unchanged, the interpretation and relative 
importance of the requirements change over time. For example, the Act applies to tangible 
goods, not to discrimination in services. The implications of this requirement are important given 
the trend of the U. S. economy toward the service sector. The RP Act simply does not apply to 
most transactions in some of the largest sectors of the economy. 
 
 
 
4.3 THE DECLINE IN IMPORTANCE OF THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 
4.3.1 FTC Enforcement Policy 
 
The RP Act may be enforced by three different constituents: private parties, the Department of 
Justice, and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).  The Department of Justice typically enforced 
the criminal provisions of the Act while the FTC enforced the civil provisions. Private parties 
can and do bring their own cases with the possible outcome of treble damages as well as attorney 
fees. The Department of Justice has not enforced the criminal provisions of the Act since the 
1960’s and the FTC has decreased its activity in civil enforcement as well. In the early history of 
the act, the FTC did devote considerable resources toward enforcement. For example, in the 
1965-1968 timeframe, the FTC investigated an average of 97 complaints and filed 27 cases 
annually. However, that number declined throughout the next several decades such that the FTC 
has only filed one case since 199210
                                                 
10 2007 Antitrust Modernization Commission Report and Recommendations April 2007 
.  
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 This lack of enforcement was not because of coincidence or changes in the way that 
companies do business rather it reflects changes in the way the RP Act was viewed. Originally, 
the Act was viewed positively because it had a cause that many at the time felt was important 
(e.g., Stevens 1937). The RP Act was put in place to protect smaller businesses from the buying 
power of larger chain stores.  The popular view in the 1930s was that big business was a problem 
and the enemy of consumers. Chain stores were feared, so much so that many states enacted 
taxes for companies who opened multiple outlets in a given state. An example of chain store tax 
is the Texas statute where retailers who had more than 50 stores in the state were taxed $750 
dollars per outlet (Ross 1984). 
Over time this view changed as economic analysis improved and calls were made to 
better align the RP Act with the broader antitrust laws. The purpose of antitrust laws inherently is 
to increase competition. By trying to reduce price competition and help certain buyers, many 
viewed the RP Act as a deterrent to competition. In fact, as early as the 1955 report by the 
Attorney General’s National committee to Study Antitrust Laws, the courts of the United States 
were being urged to reconcile the position of the RP Act with other antitrust laws. The federal 
government periodically commissioned reports such as the 1955 study and most come to the 
same conclusion that aligning the RP Act with the other antitrust laws was an important goal. 
The FTC has adopted a position similar to these committees and as such they have backed away 
from government enforcement of the act. Additionally, the Department of Justice in a 1977 
report indicated their position on the act by saying that it was based on “questionable economic 
assumptions prevalent in the 1930s11
 
.” In spite of the lack of government enforcement, the RP 
Act remains law and private parties can and do pursue cases in the federal court system.  
                                                 
11 Report on the Robinson-Patman Act, United States Department of Justice, 1977 
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4.3.2 Competitive Harm  
 
Competitive harm is perhaps the most complex and debated issue of the RP Act since it was 
enacted. Section 2(a) of the act prohibits price discrimination that injures any level of 
competition in distribution. Therefore, if a plaintiff fails to show that competition was harmed, 
the case is dismissed. The burden of proving harm to competition is on the plaintiff, thus, the 
issue of harm to competition is salient in many cases, as defendants will often make a motion to 
dismiss based on the fact that competition was not harmed, leaving plaintiffs with the burden of 
showing that it was.  The most common RP Act cases are primary-line and secondary-line 
violations. In primary-line violations, competition between different sellers may be injured when 
one of them engages in price discrimination while selling to at least one of their common 
customers. Figure 7 shows a typical primary-line discrimination scenario. In this simple example 
there are two sellers denoted as Seller 1 and Seller 2 who are both selling to a common buyer 
known as Buyer 1. If, for example, Seller 1 has a price of $2.00 per unit and Seller 2 has a price 
of $1.50 per unit for Buyer 1 and Seller 2 is also selling to a second buyer (Buyer 2) at a higher 
price of $2.00 per unit, a primary-line price discrimination claim may be possible, if the 
jurisdictional requirements of the RP Act are fulfilled. In this claim, Seller 1 would be the 
plaintiff and Seller 2 would be the defendant. 
In secondary-line violations, competition between customers of a seller may be lessened 
if the seller differentiates between them in price. Figure 8 shows a typical secondary-line 
discrimination scenario. In this simple example there are two buyers denoted as Buyer 1 and 
Buyer 2 who are both buying from a common seller known as Seller 1. Let’s say for example 
that Seller 1 has a price of $2.00 per unit to Buyer 1 and a price of $1.50 per unit to Buyer 2. If 
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the other requirements of the act are satisfied, Buyer 2 may be able to state a secondary-line price 
discrimination claim against Seller 1 under section 2a and Buyer 2 under section 2f. But, to 
properly assert an RP Act violation, a plaintiff must do more than show a mere price difference; 
they must show competitive harm as well. 
 
To establish competitive harm in secondary-line violation, the plaintiff has two lines of 
attack. The first requires the plaintiff to show that price discrimination caused damage to 
competition, not simply damage to a competitor. Two conditions are necessary to establish this. 
The first is whether the “favored” buyer and the “disfavored” buyer are competing for the same 
customers. If not, then the RP Act is not violated. The interpretation of what the same customers 
constitute was clarified in Volvo v. Reeder12
                                                 
12 Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 860 (2006). 
 where the Supreme Court ruled that the same 
customers meant that both competing buyers must sell to common customers not just into the 
Seller 2 Price: $1.50
Figure 7
Seller 1 Price: $2.00 Seller 2 Price: $2.00    
Typical Primary-Line Case
Seller 1 
(Plaintiff)
Seller 2 
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Buyer 2Buyer 1
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same market. Second, the plaintiff must prove either loss of downstream sales or that the 
disfavored buyer was forced to reduce its output price to retain sales13
 
. This then must ultimately 
lead to higher prices for the customers of the two buyers. Because this chain of causality is 
difficult to show, directly showing competitive harm in a secondary-line is not an easy task. 
As an alternative to directly showing competitive injury, a plaintiff can utilize the 
“Morton Salt” inference to establish a violation (FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 43). 
Under this method, injury can be inferred if the disparity in price is sufficiently large and 
occurred over a substantial amount of time. Admittedly, the Morton Salt rule may appear 
inconsistent with the notion of preventing unfair competition.  In fact, many argue that the 
Morton Salt rule does the opposite by punishing efficient buyers and protecting inefficient ones 
(Stancil 2004). Nevertheless, the precedent remains and has been used successfully. In Flash 
                                                 
13 See for example, Falls City Indus., Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U. S. 428 (1983) 
Figure 8
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Elecs. v. Universal Music, 312 F. Supp. 2d 379 (E.D.N.Y 2004), the RP Act claim survived a 
motion to dismiss with the judge stating that, “a prohibited effect on competition may be inferred 
from evidence that an individual competitor suffered injury from ‘a substantial price difference 
over time.’” 
The judicial interpretation of primary-line injury under the RP Act has evolved over the 
course of the Act’s history. The original interpretation of the act was that injury to a competitor 
and injury to competition was synonymous. Consequently, if the price discrimination by the 
defendant was shown to cause injury to another competitor (e.g., lost profits, exit business) then 
an RP Act case could be proven. An early case where this position is laid out is Utah Pie Co. v. 
Continental Baking Co., 386 U. S. 685 (1967). In this case, the Supreme Court reversed an 
appeals court ruling that overturned a jury ruling for the plaintiff.  
Utah Pie was a private party case where the plaintiff was a regional pie baker facing 
increased competition by national bakers. Continental Baking, a large pie baker, slashed its price 
in the Salt Lake City market below the cost to make the pies in order to gain market share. Other 
large pie bakers in the market slashed their prices as well. Utah pie responded to this by filing a 
price discrimination suit seeking an injunction and treble damages.  
The original trial ended in a jury ruling for Utah pie but the Court of Appeals overturned 
this verdict. The Supreme Court decided to hear the case and held that showing below cost 
pricing was enough to show “predatory intent” and that the jury ruling in favor of the plaintiff 
was warranted. Critics at the time felt that this ruling made showing predatory pricing too easy 
(e.g., Bowman 1967; Elzinga and Hogarty 1978). The main argument of the detractors was that 
declining prices are inherently good for consumers. And, unless a price war creates a monopoly 
or a market structure where one competitor has significant market power such that prices are 
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subsequently raised, a market where prices are declining is a sign of healthy competition.  It is 
this type of competition that antitrust laws were put in place to try to foster. 
4.3.3 Brooke Group vs. Brown and Williamson 
 
It was twenty-five additional years until the high court decided to revisit the issue of competitive 
harm in primary-line RP Act cases. In the intervening years, many argued that showing 
competitive harm in RP Act cases should have the same requirements as showing injury inflicted 
by predatory pricing schemes actionable under section 2 of the Sherman Act. There are two 
prerequisites for a plaintiff seeking to establish a competitive injury under the Sherman Act. 
First, the plaintiff must prove that the prices complained of are below an appropriate measure of 
its rival’s costs. Second, the plaintiff must show that the competitor has a dangerous probability 
of recouping its investment in below cost prices.14
The interpretation of competitive harm in primary-line cases was brought in line with the 
Sherman Act by the Supreme Court in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp. (92-466), 509 U.S. 209 (1993). This case involved two cigarette manufacturers who were 
among the six largest competitors in the market. Brooke Group faced declining market share in 
the cigarette industry and tried to boost its sagging market share by introducing a generic 
  In order to show that the investment in below 
cost prices could be recouped, a plaintiff must be able to show that consumer prices ultimately 
increased to a level above where they before the discrimination and that this high price level is 
sustainable. Utah Pie only required showing that a defendant lowered prices to a level that were 
below the cost to make the goods. The second requirement of showing recoupment is a much 
higher hurdle. 
                                                 
14 See Brooke Group Ltd.  v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222, 125 L. Ed. 2d 168, 113 S. Ct. 2578 (U.S. 
1993). 
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cigarette to the market. Brown and Williamson responded to this by introducing its own line of 
generic cigarettes at the same price as Brooke Group. However, when the two companies were 
utilizing the same distributor, Brown and Williamson offered discriminatory rebates.  
Brooke Group’s theory of price discrimination was that this action by Brown and 
Williamson would force Brooke Group to retreat from the generic market and ultimately lead to 
higher consumer prices for generic cigarettes. In their case, Brooke Group effectively showed 
that Brown and Williamson priced below cost and also argued that this was irrational without the 
prospect of recoupment, but they did not show that Brown and Williamson could actually recoup 
their investment in below cost pricing. The Supreme Court ruled that because Brooke Group 
could not show that the actions of Brown and Williamson ultimately would lead to higher prices 
for generics, they were not entitled to relief under the RP Act. The court ruled this way because 
they felt that maintaining supracompetitive prices, at the scale needed, was highly unlikely given 
the cigarette market structure.  
The cigarette market structure at the time was such that Brown and Williamson’s market 
share of the entire cigarette market never exceeded 12% and that there were several other large 
competitors in the market such as Philip Morris and R. J. Reynolds. These other large 
manufacturers could easily enter the generic market segment if prices became sufficiently 
attractive.  Given this, the court felt that Brown and Williamson would not have a reasonable 
prospect of recouping their investment in below cost pricing therefore consumers were not 
harmed, rather they benefited from the below cost pricing. 
The court stopped short of saying that recoupment was impossible in an oligopoly but 
indicated that recoupment was unlikely unless the pricing scheme ultimately created a monopoly. 
The fact that they did not adopt a “Chicago School” view and consider any instance of predatory 
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pricing in an oligopoly as irrational was encouraging to some commentators (Baker 1994). 
However, most view the Brooke Group ruling as a major blow that seriously dwindled the 
possibility of a plaintiff winning a primary-line RP Act case (e.g. Denger and Herfort 1994; 
Glazer 1994).    
In order to substantiate the legal analysis that the Brooke Group ruling was deleterious to 
the prohibitions of the RP Act, I empirically examine whether the likelihood of a plaintiff 
winning an RP Act case has decreased after the ruling. To my knowledge, this is the first such 
attempt to empirically measure the effect of the Brooke Group ruling. I do this by examining a 
data set created from twenty-five years of federal cases (1982-2006) where an RP Act claim was 
made. 
 
 
 
4.4  EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
4.4.1 Model 
 
 
To test how the Brooke Group ruling has changed the outcome of Robinson-Patman Act cases, I 
develop a model where the case outcome is the dependent variable given as follows:  
   Y= 1 if the case is ruled for the Plaintiff  
Y=0 if the case is ruled for the Defendant. 
Cases that are classified as rulings for the defendant include several legal outcomes: summary 
judgment for the defendant, dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims, and jury rulings for the defendant. 
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Rulings for the plaintiff include: summary judgment for the plaintiff, failure to dismiss the 
plaintiff’s claims15
                                                 
15 I recognize that there is a censoring issue in these cases because additional rulings for a given case may occur 
after the data collection is completed.  However I do not have data on the status of the case as to whether it was 
subsequently settled out of court or if future motions are pending in front of Federal Court. As more time passes 
from these rulings we become more confident that no future rulings are pending.  Two facts mitigate this issue. First, 
I update the database with rulings from existing cases through 1/31/08, so that all cases have at least two years of 
additional time for appeals court rulings. Second, any rulings that are erroneously classified as rulings for the 
plaintiff work counter to our main hypothesis as we are looking for a tougher environment after Brooke Group. 
 and jury rulings for the plaintiff. 
 The model that I estimate is a probit model. The goal of this analysis is to show whether 
the Brooke Group ruling changed the outcome of RP Act cases and also to show how the ruling 
impacts the effect of various case characteristics. That is, I want to show if case characteristics 
and plaintiff and defendant characteristics play a role in case outcome and if that role changes in 
the aftermath of the Brooke Group decision. In the following sections I provide a justification for 
the independent variables that are included in the model and provide the expectation of what I 
should find upon estimating the model. 
 Brooke Group Ruling. I include a variable in the model that indicates whether the case 
occurred before or after the Brooke Group ruling. This variable is used in two ways. First, I 
include the variable in the model by itself as a main effect. Second, I use it to create interaction 
variables with all other variables in the model. These interaction variables allow us to examine 
whether the effects of the independent variables change after the Brooke Group ruling. 
This method of constructing the variables means that the coefficients of the model can be 
interpreted in the following manner. The main effects parameters of all of the independent 
variables will be the magnitude of the effect of that variable before the Brooke Group ruling. The 
interaction of the independent variable and the Brooke Group indicator variable will be the 
change in effect of that variable after Brooke Group. Thus, to get the magnitude of the effect of 
the variable after Brooke Group, the main effect and interaction variable must be added together.  
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 The expectation is that I will not find a significant main effect for the Brooke Group 
variable because the Brooke Group ruling will only apply to cases that have certain 
characteristics. Thus, I expect that the effect of the Brooke Group ruling will be seen in the 
interaction variables. 
 Type of case.  One aspect that should impact the relative success of plaintiffs is the type 
of case: primary-line or secondary-line. This needs to be taken into account because as was 
explained in the previous section of this manuscript, the judicial interpretation of competitive 
harm is different for primary and secondary-line cases. Because of the different standards, I do 
not have a strong expectation of whether primary-line cases or secondary-line cases will be more 
likely to be ruled for the plaintiff. However, after the Brooke Group ruling the probability of a 
ruling for the plaintiff should decrease most in primary-line cases.  
 No harm to competition defense. The issue of competitive harm was explained in detail 
in a previous section of this manuscript. This variable is included in the model because the 
change in interpretation of competitive harm by the Brooke Group ruling should lead to a 
decrease in success for plaintiffs in cases where a competitive harm ruling was made. While 
there are other defenses available to defendants (e.g., meeting competition, cost justification), 
these defenses are not addressed in the Brooke Group ruling thus should not change because of 
the Brooke Group ruling. Therefore, I aggregate cases with all other defenses into one category 
and put cases where competitive harm was used in the other category. A summary of the 
prevalence of defenses used in RP Act cases is contained in Table 13. 
  
94 
 
 
Table 13 
Prevalence of Defenses in RP Act Cases 
Defense 
% of 
Cases 
Cost Justification/ Functional Discount 5.3 
 Changing Market Conditions 0.3 
 Meeting Competition 1.6 
 Functional Availability 4.7 
 Fee for Services Rendered 5.7 
 No Harm to Competition 42.3   
 
 Resources. I believe that resources will play an important and interesting role in the 
outcome of RP Act cases.  The measure of resources that we include in the model is company 
revenues. I classify both plaintiffs and defendants as large if their revenues are greater than 50 
million dollars a year. The role of resources is complicated by the history of the act. On one 
hand, the Act is written and may be interpreted in a way to protect small companies. An example 
of this is the aforementioned Morton Salt rule, which is recognized as a way to remove the 
burden of proving market-wide competitive injury for small retailers.16
                                                 
16 See American Booksellers v. Barnes and Nobel, 135 F. Supp. 2d 1031 (2001 N.D. Cal.). 
 Accordingly, being 
smaller may not be such a burden for a plaintiff. On the other hand, involvement in an RP Act 
case is undoubtedly a costly endeavor. In order to successfully win a case as a plaintiff, a prima 
facie case must first be presented to Federal District Court. This may involve multiple motions 
and briefs to the court. If the prima facie case is made, a jury trial may be held where expert 
testimony may be required. This suggests that receiving relief under the RP Act is a resource 
intensive process. Thus, it may be reasonable to expect that firms with greater resources to 
expend on litigation will have greater success as both plaintiffs and defendants.  
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Moreover, I expect that the Brooke Group ruling will change the way resources impact 
the outcome of cases. First, because this ruling places the additional burden of showing 
recoupment on the plaintiffs, the resources that a plaintiff has may become more important after 
the ruling. This will make the probability of receiving a favorable ruling after the Brooke Group 
case more likely for large plaintiffs as compared to smaller plaintiffs. Second, I believe that the 
Brooke Group ruling will have an opposite effect on defendants. The logic for this is that 
defeating an RP Act allegation may have become easier. Because of the heightened competitive 
harm standard, it may be a good strategy for defendants to make an early motion to dismiss 
based on the fact that there was no competitive harm. Furthermore, the burden of proving 
competitive harm is on the plaintiff and, if they are unable to do so, the case will end quickly and 
the resources available to defendants will become less important. Thus, after the Brooke Group 
ruling large defendants may no longer be better positioned in RP Act cases.  
 Industry. Industry was used in the model because characteristics of the industry may lead 
to greater success in pursuing an RP Act case. I classify cases into two broad industries: 
consumer goods and industrial goods which is consistent with the history of the act. The Act was 
originally targeted at retail chain stores, which sell consumer goods; hence the judicial 
interpretation of the Act may lead to an environment where companies in the consumer goods 
industry have an advantage when pursuing RP Act cases. Thus, I predict that cases in the 
consumer goods industry will have a greater probability of being ruled for the plaintiff.  
However, after the Brooke Group ruling showing recoupment may be tougher in the 
consumer goods industry. In general, there are more firms competing in consumer markets as 
compared to industrial markets which are characterized by large buyers and sellers (Kotler and 
Armstrong 2007). As is evidenced by the Brooke Group ruling, showing recoupment is tougher 
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when more firms are present in an industry. This is true because competing firms decrease the 
likelihood that a company can raise prices to a supracompetitive level. Consequently, after the 
Brooke Group ruling the probability of a ruling for plaintiffs in the consumer goods industry 
should decrease.  
 
4.4.2 Data 
 
 
The dataset for this manuscript was constructed by searching for all cases that involved an RP 
Act ruling during the twenty-five year period from 1982-2006. This time period reflects a sizable 
and relatively equal amount of time before and after the Brooke Group ruling. In order to find the 
RP Act cases, I searched the Academic Lexis-Nexus database for federal cases where the RP Act 
was mentioned. From this search, I examined every record that was returned to see if the case 
had an RP Act ruling or merely mentioned the Act for some other purpose.  
After filtering out cases where the RP Act was merely mentioned, I merged cases where 
there were multiple rulings at possibly different levels of federal court such that each set of 
plaintiffs and defendants only represented one case in the final dataset. The case outcome was 
determined by the most recent ruling in the case. So, for example, if a case was initially ruled for 
the plaintiff but overturned by the Court of Appeals, the case was recorded as a ruling for the 
defendant in the final database. The additional variables used in the model were coded by 
reading the cases. When information that was required was not available from the case record, I 
searched for other sources for that data.  
Information about plaintiff and defendant revenue was not typically contained within the 
case record. In order to find this data, I searched other sections of the Lexis-Nexus database as 
97 
 
well as the Business and Company Resource Center. This search often returned a value for the 
actual revenue or a range within which the company revenue was contained. However, not every 
company could be located from these sources. In these cases, I performed a general internet 
search to find the data, and if this did not provide the information, I used my judgment to classify 
the companies as large or small. Typically, when I couldn’t find revenue information it was 
because the company was a small retailer who operated from one location. Therefore, I could 
reasonably classify them as a small plaintiff or defendant. After performing the data collection 
process, the final dataset contained 298 cases. Table 14 has summary statistics of the data for 
both before and after the Brooke Group ruling.  
Table 14 
Descriptive Statistics Before and After Brooke Group 
Variable Before After 
Number of Cases 153 145 
No Harm to Competition Defense was used 41% 51% 
Plaintiff Over 50 Million in Revenue 24% 17% 
Defendant over 50 Million in Revenue 65% 77% 
Consumer Goods Industry 67% 45% 
Primary-Line Case 27% 22% 
 
4.4.3 Results 
 
 
Table 15 presents the coefficient estimates, standard error and p-values from the estimation of 
the model. The results can be interpreted such that negative coefficients indicate a greater 
probability of a ruling for the plaintiff and the interaction variables are the change in magnitude 
of the parameters after the Brook Group ruling.   
  Main Effect of Brooke Group Ruling.  Confirming expectations, I find no main effect of 
the Brooke Group ruling.    However, if I examine the predicted probabilities generated by the 
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model, I do find a shift toward a lower probability of a ruling for the plaintiff. The model shows 
that the overall probability of a ruling for the plaintiff was 35% before the Brooke Group ruling 
but dropped to 23% after the ruling (see Figure 9). So, while the main effect of the Brooke Group 
parameter is not significant, the overall probability shifts toward the plaintiffs after Brooke 
Group. The combination of these results indicates that the ruling did not have a general effect of 
making it tougher on plaintiffs; rather, the effect was confined to cases with certain 
characteristics. 
Table 15 
Robinson-Patman Estimation Results 
  Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error p-Value 
Intercept 0.782  0.272 0.004  
No Harm to Competition Defense -0.741  0.236 0.002  
Consumer Goods Industry -0.344  0.242 0.156  
Small Plaintiff 0.677  0.350 0.053  
Small Defendant 0.381  0.258 0.140  
Primary-Line Case -0.805  0.289 0.005  
Brooke Group   0.161  0.426 0.705  
Brooke Group X No Harm to Competition 
Defense 0.832  0.340 0.015  
Brooke Group X Consumer Goods -0.158  0.346 0.649  
Brooke Group X Small Plaintiff -0.943  0.472 0.046  
Brooke Group X Small Defendant -0.475  0.408 0.244  
Brooke Group X Primary-Line 1.692   0.492 0.001   
 
 Type of Case. Prior to the Brooke Group ruling, I expected to find no difference in the 
probability of success for plaintiffs but afterward, my expectation was that the probability of 
rulings for the plaintiff would decrease in primary-line cases. The results confirm my 
expectation.  Interestingly, the main effect of the Primary-Line variable has a negative 
coefficient, indicating that before Brooke Group Primary-Line cases were more likely to be ruled 
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for the plaintiff than Secondary-Line cases. However, the Brooke Group X Primary-Line 
interaction coefficient shows a large positive effect, indicating a shift in probability toward 
rulings for the defense after Brooke Group. The magnitudes of these results are difficult to 
interpret from the coefficient estimates, thus, to better understand the results, I use the predicted 
probabilities generated by the model (See Figure 9). By separately examining primary-line cases, 
I find the predicted probability of a ruling for the plaintiff drops from 58% to 6%. This shows 
how unlikely it is to win Primary-Line RP Act case after Brooke Group and the large magnitude 
of the change in primary-line cases shows the importance of the Brooke Group ruling. 
Interestingly, the change in probability for Secondary-Line Cases was negligible, indicating the 
Brooke Group ruling had no effect on these cases. 
Figure 9 
Effect of Type of Case on Predicted Probability of Ruling for Plaintiff 
Type of Case Before                 Brooke Group 
After               
Brooke Group Total 
Primary-Line 58% 6% 35% 
Secondary-Line 28% 27% 27% 
Total 35% 23% 29% 
 
 No Harm to Competition Defense. Similar to the primary-line variable, I had no 
expectation before the Brooke Group ruling but afterward I expect cases where competitive harm 
rulings were made to have a greater probability of being ruled for the plaintiff. The findings 
support this expectation as I find that the No Harm to Competition parameter is significant and 
negative and that the Brooke Group X No Harm to Competition Defense parameter is significant 
and positive. Thus, before Brooke Group, compared to cases without a competitive harm ruling, 
cases with a competitive harm ruling were more likely to be ruled for the plaintiff. The 
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interaction parameter indicates this effect is nullified after the ruling. The predicted probabilities 
in Figure 4 help to determine the magnitude of the change. Before the Brooke Group ruling, 
cases with a competitive harm defense were ruled for the plaintiff 52% of the time with cases 
without the defense were ruled for the plaintiffs 24% of the time. This trend reverses after the 
ruling as cases with a competitive harm defense were ruled for the plaintiff 20% of the time but 
cases without a competitive harm defense were ruled for plaintiffs 25% of the time. This 
supports my position that the change in competitive harm standard by Brooke Group lead to less 
success for plaintiffs in RP Act cases. 
Figure 10 
Effect of Competitive Harm on Predicted Probability of Ruling for Plaintiff 
No Harm to 
Competition 
Defense 
Before                 
Brooke Group 
After               
Brooke Group Total 
Yes 52% 20% 35% 
No 24% 25% 24% 
Total 35% 23% 29% 
  
 Resources. I included company revenue as an independent variable in the model to 
account for the amount of resources that a company has to expend on a case. Our expectation 
was that resources would be important for both plaintiffs and defendants but, after the Brooke 
group ruling resources would become more important for plaintiffs and less important for 
defendants. Our results only support the view that resources become more important for 
plaintiffs after Brooke Group. Interestingly, I also find a significant effect for plaintiff size before 
the Brooke group ruling. The result implies that before Brooke Group compared to small 
plaintiffs, it was harder for large plaintiffs to win RP Act cases. However, the significant effect 
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for the Large Plaintiff X Brooke Group interaction implies that the advantage of small plaintiffs 
decreases after Brooke Group. In Figure 5, the predicted probabilities generated by the model are 
shown. 
 The model predicts that before Brooke Group, small plaintiffs win 39% of the time while 
large plaintiffs only win 25% of the time. After the ruling, this trend reverses and I find that large 
plaintiffs win 28% of the time but small plaintiffs only win 22% of the time. This is consistent 
with my theorizing that resources would become more important after Brooke Group. 
Surprisingly, I did not find any effect of defendant size. Thus, I find no support that it has 
become easier for defendants after Brooke Group. 
Figure 11 
Effect of Plaintiff Size on Predicted Probability of Ruling for Plaintiff 
Plaintiff Size Before                 Brooke Group 
After               
Brooke Group Total 
Large 25% 28% 26% 
Small 39% 22% 30% 
Total 35% 23% 29% 
  
  Industry. I classified cases as coming from two broad industries: consumer goods and 
industrial goods. The prediction was that because of the history of the act, it would be 
advantageous for plaintiffs to have cases in the consumer goods industry. However, after the 
Brooke Group ruling it would be more difficult for plaintiffs in the consumer goods industry 
because of the recoupment requirement. Surprisingly, my model indicates no significant effect of 
industry. 
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4.5 DISCUSSION 
4.5.1 Summary 
 
In this essay, I examined an antitrust law that holds in important place in the marketing discipline 
known as the Robinson-Patman Act. This law has typically been introduced in marketing courses 
because it affects pricing which is an important activity traditionally under the scope of 
marketing. Our observation was that the market place reality was not aligned with the original 
goal of the Act which was to protect small independent businesses from the power of larger 
chain stores. In contrast to an environment where small businesses were flourishing, I saw that 
large retailers were increasing their dominance in the market and that they were gaining pricing 
power over their rivals and suppliers. Thus, I set out to uncover why this was the case. 
 In reviewing the history of the act, I found that economists and legal scholars began to 
argue for bringing the RP Act in line with the broader body of antitrust laws including the 
Sherman Act (e.g., Bowman 1967). The basis of their argument was that antitrust laws were put 
in place to protect competition (i.e. consumers) and not individual competitors. Over time, this 
argument gained support and culminated with the landmark Brooke Group vs. Brown and 
Williamson Supreme Court Ruling. This ruling required that plaintiffs show below cost pricing 
and a reasonable prospect of recoupment in order to prove competitive harm in a primary-line 
case.  Legal scholars have debated the importance of this ruling from a legal perspective but as 
marketers I analyzed this ruling from an empirical perspective to quantify how it affected the 
actual outcome of RP Act cases. 
 I found that after the Brooke Group ruling, winning an RP Act case has become 
significantly tougher for plaintiffs. However, the model shows that there was no main effect of 
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the Brooke Group ruling; rather the effects were isolated to primary-line cases and cases where a 
competitive harm determination was made. The effect of type of case was particularly strong as 
the predicted probability of a ruling for the plaintiff decreased sharply in Primary-Line cases 
after the ruling. This finding suggests that businesses facing price discrimination as defined in a 
primary-line scenario have little legal recourse to protect them. Given the resources required to 
pursue an RP Act case, undertaking a primary-line case may be an unwise investment.  
Additionally, I find that cases that had a competitive harm determination and occurred 
after the Brooke Group ruling were significantly more likely to be ruled for the defendant than 
for the plaintiff. This suggests that a proper course of action for defendants in RP Act cases 
would be to make an early motion to dismiss or for summary judgment on the grounds that 
competition was not harmed by the purported price discrimination. This will lead to a quick 
resolution of the case in many instances and will undoubtedly lead to cost savings for defendants. 
Finally, I found that after the Brooke Group ruling, it has become significantly less likely 
for small plaintiffs receive favorable rulings as compared to large plaintiffs. Thus, viewing the 
act as a protector of small businesses may not be an accurate depiction. If the law offers less 
protection to this group, the value of keeping the law on the books in its current form is 
diminished. 
 
4.5.2 Implications for Marketers 
 
The decreased probability of actually receiving legal relief from the RP Act suggests several 
important implications for marketers. First, because I show that obtaining a ruling for the 
plaintiff is particularly hard in primary-line RP Act cases; managers should incorporate this 
knowledge when deciding whether to pursue a primary-line RP Act case. The resources needed 
104 
 
to carry out an RP Act case are not trivial. In one example where attorney fees for an RP Act 
case were sought in Federal Court, the fees incurred by the plaintiff were well over $1,000,00017
                                                 
17 See Hasbrouck v. Texaco, 631 F. Supp. 258 (1986) 
. 
Given this reality, the resources may be better spent on differentiating themselves from 
competitors or on engaging in more competitive pricing, for example. This is true because the 
current competitive harm standard suggests that the courts are willing to let the free market take 
its own course without legal intervention. Thus, expending resources on such a case may not be 
the best option. 
 Second, because of recoupment standard put into place by Brooke Group, managers 
should be willing to take a more aggressive approach to their pricing policies. These policies 
should not consider the RP Act as banning price discrimination, rather they should view pricing 
through the ultimate effect on consumers. If a discriminatory pricing policy ultimately leads to 
lower consumer prices, it will be viewed positively by the legal system and will not be subject to 
penalties under the act. Thus, I do not advocate breaking the law; I simply suggest it should be 
viewed in light of the Brooke Group ruling.  
Finally, marketing academics should communicate how the interpretation of the Act has 
changed to the next generation of managers. Given the difficulty in showing competitive harm 
under the RP Act, we should no longer simply indicate that a law exists that prevents price 
discrimination (e.g. Boone and Kurtz 2008). Instead, we should highlight the conditions where 
the RP Act is applicable and give the possible benefits of price discrimination.  This will prevent 
managers from being risk averse in their pricing policies and may ultimately increase consumer 
welfare. 
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4.5.3 Conclusion 
 
The Robinson-Patman Act has been a controversial antitrust law since its enactment in 1936. The 
Brooke Group ruling by the Supreme Court in 1993 brought an end to much of the controversy 
by bringing the interpretation of primary-line competitive harm in synch with the broader 
antitrust laws. Moreover, in doing this, the courts have made life much more difficult for 
plaintiffs. Given the reality of this environment, small businesses have little recourse when they 
are the victim of price discrimination, especially in certain types of cases. While the ability of 
companies to offer discriminatory prices to some of their customers may ultimately benefit 
consumers in the form of lower prices, the small businesses that fail in the process are a legacy in 
some part created by the interpretation of the RP Act.  
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5.0 CONCLUSION 
 
 
This dissertation, in three essays, examines the impact of the changes in the retail landscape on 
the competitive and legal retail environment. In this dissertation, I have made three contributions 
to the literature. First, I develop a new measure that characterizes how consumer purchases are 
spread across retail formats. This measure, which I call the Channel blurring Index, can be 
calculated at the household, segment or aggregate level. It can be used to characterize the 
behavior of shoppers and understand whether purchases are concentrated in one format or if 
households are spreading their purchases around. 
 The second contribution of this dissertation is to better understand the factors that drive 
the store choice decision. In essay 1, I look at the store choice decision at the highest level: the 
retail format choice. I estimate a choice model at the category level and find that household level 
preferences for formats can be explained by demographic and shopping behavioral variables. 
Additionally, I find the factors that are associated with greater levels of channel blurring. This 
analysis shows that those households that buy a higher proportion of private label goods tend to 
have greater format loyalty. In essay 2, I look at the store choice decision at the chain level. 
Several interesting insights are derived from this analysis. First, I find that food price image has a 
larger effect on chain choice as compared to non-food price image. This has implications for 
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promotion policies of retailers as they may want to focus more resources on food categories 
rather than non-food categories. Second, assortment breadth and depth affects different chains in 
divergent ways. This finding has implications for retailers wishing to expand or trim assortment. 
 The third contribution that this dissertation makes is that I find that the Robinson-Patman 
Act has declined in importance. By empirically examining the case history of the act, I find that 
after the landmark Brooke Group vs. Brown and Williamson case, obtaining relief under the Act 
has become much more difficult. This is especially important with respect to primary line cases. 
Given this finding and the heightened recoupment standard put into place by Brooke Group, 
managers should be willing to take a more aggressive approach to their pricing policies. 
Managers should think that the Robinson-Patman Act bans price discrimination; rather they 
should look at the pricing policy’s ultimate effect on consumers. If a discriminatory pricing 
policy ultimately leads to lower consumer prices, it will be viewed positively by the legal system 
and will not be subject to penalties under the act. Thus, I do not advocate breaking the law; I 
simply suggest that the law should be viewed in light of the Brooke Group ruling. 
 This dissertation tries to build on existing retailing knowledge and to provide managers 
with insights that they can use in their stores. I think that the retailing industry will be a fruitful 
area of research and moving beyond issues such as brand choice and into other areas will benefit 
many.  
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